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Abstract:  
More than ten years ago, to increase mothers’ participation in the labour market and to 
enhance child development, the province of Québec implemented a $5 per day universal 
childcare policy. This paper provides a comprehensive review of the costs and benefits 
of the program over that period. A non-experimental evaluation framework based on 
multiple pre- and post-treatment periods is used to estimate the policy effects. We find 
that the reform had important and lasting effects on the number of children aged 1 to 4 
attending childcare and the numbers of hours they spend in daycare. For children aged 
5, we uncovered strong evidence that implementing full-day kindergarten alone was not 
enough to increase maternal labour force participation and weeks worked, but when 
combined with the low-fee daycare program it was, and these effects were also long 
lasting. Our results on cognitive development suggest that the school setting is more 
successful in raising children’s cognitive ability than the daycare setting. Finally, we 
show that the fiscal costs were most likely larger than the benefits. 
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1 Introduction
In the mid 1990s, in order to promote work-life balance and improve early childhood hu-
man capital development, the province of Québec (the second most populated province in
Canada) developed and implemented an ambitious universal early childhood education and
care (ECEC) program. Starting in September 1st 1997, accredited and regulated childcare
facilities o¤ered publicly subsidized daycare at the very low fee of $5 per child per full-day
for children aged 4 on September 30th 1997. Over time, the age requirement for subsidized
spaces progressively decreased and the number of subsidized $5 per day spaces increased.
By September 2000, the low-fee policy applied to all children aged 0 to 5.
Since September 1997, the number of regulated daycare spaces increased from 78,864 to
245,107 by the end of March 2012 (see Figure 1). Overall, 18% of all children aged 0 to 4
in Québec attended regulated childcare in late 1997 compared to 75% by 2012. Over this
period, familieschildcare arrangements changed dramatically. At the same time growing
public funds were dedicated to the program: direct public subsidies increased from $288
million in scal year 1996-1997 to $2.2 billion for scal year 2011-2012, while the average
subsidy per space increased from $3,832 to $10,210 over the same period (see Figure 2). No
policy close to this magnitude impacting preschool children (including kindergarten) was
enacted in the other Canadian provinces between 1997 and 2009 (see Table A.1).
Previous studies on Québecs childcare reform show that it had a large positive impact on
the labour supply of mothers measured by participation, annual weeks worked, annual hours
worked, and annual earnings, for both mothers with children aged 1 to 5 (Lefebvre and Mer-
rigan, 2008) and mothers with children aged 6 to 11 (but no children less than 6) (Lefebvre
et al., 2009). Baker et al. (2008), using a di¤erent data set than Lefebvre and Merrigan, also
nd substantial positive e¤ects on the labour force participation of mothers. Furthermore,
they nd that for the rst year after the introduction of the childcare reform, some health
and behavioural outcomes of children and parents in Québec have worsened relative to the
Rest of Canada (RofC, for the other nine provinces). Parent-reported behavioural measures
of child aggressiveness and anxiety show signicant worsening, as do measures of parenting
skills, maternal depression and parental relationship-satisfaction indices. The period covered
by their study ends in 2002, just one year after the full implementation of the program. At
the time, no data was available on children who had been eligible for the daycare program
since birth. As such, as pointed out by the authors, their ndings may reect short-run
e¤ects.
This study documents the enduring/persevering e¤ects of this unique large scale "nat-
ural" policy experiment now well established, up to 2009, on the labour supply of mothers
with young children and observe whether the e¤ects found in Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008)
hold up for the later years of the policy. This is however not the value added of the paper. We
also estimate the impact of the policy on outcomes that were neglected in former studies, in
particular, the time children spend in formal childcare (conditionnally or not, on attending
2
daycare), paternal labour force participation and weeks worked, family income and earn-
ings, poverty and welfare receipt, and cognitive development of children at ages 4 and 5 as
measured by three tests scores. The estimates of the policy e¤ects on these outcomes are
important to fully grasp the impact of the reform and to form expectations about the e¤ects
of a universal low-fee extensive childcare policy.
Furthermore, this is the rst study to document the impacts by age of the child interacting
with maternal education and family status. There are several reasons to study the impact
of the policy by age, however, two stand out. First, two major parental leave policy reforms,
making them more generous, were implemented in December 31st 2000 and January 1st 2006.
The rst was nationwide while the second occured only in Québec. Therefore, analysing the
labour supply of mothers with children less than 1 who are a¤ected by the childcare and
parental leave policy is of importance for policy makers. Second, the year following childcare
reform in Québec, half-day publicly provided school-based kindergarten was replaced with
full-day kindergarten a¤ecting ve year-olds and their mother.
Curiously, impacts of the Québec childcare policy on the labour supply of single mothers
were also neglected in past studies. The results we nd in this regard are among the most
interesting of the paper. Although the sample sizes are rather small for children with single
mothers by education level, we nd that the policy did produce much di¤erent impacts,
in line with di¤erent policies, depending on the age of the child, family structure and the
mothers level of education. Breaking down the e¤ect by level of education allows us to assess
the impacts of the reform from an equity standpoint. Although the price is the same for all,1
more educated mothers may benet more from the policy as their higher skills increase the
chances they return to work early to a job that is better paid than less qualied mothers.
Finally, taking into account the estimated impact on labour force participation, this study
provides a careful evaluation of the scal impacts of the policy at both levels of government,
federal and provincial.
We use Statistics Canadas National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY)
for the estimation of the impacts of the policy and rely on a non-experimental framework
where the evolution of outcomes for Québec children and their parents are compared with
those of comparable children and parents in the RofC. To estimate the scal impacts of the
policy we use Statistics Canadas 2004 Longitudinal Survey of Income Dynamics (SLID).
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes Québecs ECEC program.
Section 3 reviews evidence from prior research. Section 4 identies the conceptual issues and
lays the framework for the analysis. Section 5 briey describes the data set. It also presents
the evolution of childcare use and arrangements over the implementation of the program and
traces the unique evolution of Québec among Canadian provinces in this regard. Section 6
presents econometric results on the impact of the daycare policy on hours of formal childcare
1More precisely, all parents whose children attend subsidized daycare, pay the same price except for
welfare mothers returning to the labour market who pay a reduced fee.
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and parental labour supply. Section 7 o¤ers some evidence of the impact of the policy on
family income and earnings, welfare participation and the incidence of low-income status.
Section 8 presents the estimated impacts of the policy on the changes in families income
taxes and transfers for both levels of government. Section 9 discusses the results for the
policy impacts on cognitive test scores for children aged 4 and 5. Section 10 provides a
summary of the benets and costs of Québecs childcare program.
2 Québecs preschool policies
On September 1st 1997, childcare facilities licensed and regulated2 by Québecs Ministry of
the Family and Elders (MFA) started o¤ering spaces at the low fee of $5 per day per child.
At the time, only children aged 4 as of September 30th 1997 were eligible. The 3-year-olds
(on September 30th) became eligible on September 1st 1998 and 2-year-olds on September
1st 1999. By September 1st 2000, all children aged less than 59 months were eligible. The
exception is children aged 5 (60 months) as of September 30th who enter public school
kindergarten.3 The Québec ECEC program pursued two explicit objectives: (1) increase
motherslabour force participation (while balancing the needs of workplace and home) and
(2) enhance child development and school readiness. We rst discuss the reform as it applied
to pre-kindergarten children and then discuss the kindergarten reform.
Figure 14 shows the evolution of the number of regulated spaces from 1994 to 2012. The
total number of spaces in the network increased from 78,864 in 1997 to 133,250 in 2001,
when all children became eligible. In 1997, none of the spaces were at the low fee of $5
per day, while most regulated spaces (99.5%) were "low-fee" in 2001.5 By March 2012,
the number of regulated spaces reached 245,107 (with 89% "low-fee"). This represents a
211 percent increase over the 1997-2012 period. Figure 1 further shows the breakdown of
spaces by mode of care. It is clear that early in the reform non-prot providers (centre and
family-based) were the main beneciaries of the policy.
The increasing number of spaces was paralleled by an increasing subsidy cost to the gov-
ernment. Before September 1997, the government provided grants to all regulated childcare
facilities to cover part of their xed costs and also to low-income families (in the form of a
fee-subsidy) according to certain eligibility criteria. In 1996-1997, these subsidies amounted
to 288 million dollars. Under the childcare reform, these subsidies were gradually abolished.
Instead, the regulated and subsidized childcare providers receive a xed amount per child
per day, depending on the age and type of childcare setting, complemented with the low-fee
2Regulated childcare may take a variety of forms: not-for-prot daycare centres, for-prot daycare centres,
and family-based daycare (caring for no more than 6 children).
3This is the rst year of pre-primary school for most children in Canada. Age eligibility is di¤erent in the
other provinces (5 on December 31th). Kindergarten is not compulsory, but most children are enrolled.
4See Appendix for more details on this gure.
5Information on the number of low-fee spaces is only available as of 2001. As such, it is not possible to
present the evolution of the number of low-fee spaces between 1998 and 2001.
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contribution of the family. By 2011-2012, the total government subsidy reached 2.2 billion
dollars. Figure 2 shows the provincial governments total direct cost6 and average cost per
space for the childcare program between 1996 and 2012. While the fee per day has been xed
at $7 per day (instead of $5) since January 1st 2004, the subsidy per space continues to soar
out. Two main reasons explain this increase. First, the program, because it makes childcare
so inexpensive, has a 100% take-up rate for low-fee spaces, so that almost all children in
daycare are by now in $7 per day settings. Second, once unionized, childcare educators were
able to negotiate much better working conditions.7 In the rst year of the policy (covering
only the 4-year-olds and continuing parent fee-subsidies for the other children in daycare),
the mean subsidy per space was $3,888. For scal year 2011-2012, the subsidy amounted to
$10,210 per space (parents no longer receive direct subsidies). The mean masks important
di¤erences by setting and age of children: not-for-prot centres receive the highest average
subsidy per space ($13,235), followed by for-prot centres ($10,840), and family-based spaces
($8,514). Furthermore, the subsidy is higher for children aged less than 18 months as the
children/educator ratio is lower.
Using administrative data, we cannot trace any such elaborate picture of the evolution
of childcare services in the other provinces in Canada. However, Table A.1 provides the
number of regulated spaces by province for 2001 and 2006 as well as the number of children
receiving subsidies. In 2006, 38% of regulated daycare spaces across Canada are in Québec
(200,005 versus 325,753 spaces in the other provinces) where 196,813 children are in a totally
subsidized space compared to 155,886 children receiving a total or partial subsidy in the RofC.
Table A.1 also stresses that Québec has a unique childcare regime compared to those existing
in the other provinces in terms of provincial funding,8 monthly (daily) fees and eligibility.
Concerning kindergarten children, although there are di¤erences in kindergarten pro-
grams across Canada, the only major change in kindergarten policy over the period of our
study occurred in Québec.9 Prior to 1997, children aged 5 on September 30th were eligible
to start part-time kindergarten (2 hours and 30 minutes). As of September 1998, full-day
kindergarten was implemented in all public schools. Kindergarten is not compulsory,10 but
if a child is enrolled in a public school, he or she must attend class for the full school day and
school week. Furthermore, schools were required to o¤er before- and after-school childcare
for children aged 5 years or more for $5 per day ($7 since 2004).
Other reforms possibly interacting with the daycare reform were implemented during the
6The direct costs abstract from the childcare refundable scal credit for unsubsidized daycare.
7After the raises, roughly 85% of total costs were covered by the government subsidy. Since, the percentage
has increased because operating costs of subsidized spaces has increased steeply, while the $7 daily fee has
remained unchanged to this date since 2004.
8In the other provinces, licensed childcare providers may receive one-time funding (for the expansion of
spaces) or recurrent funding (for equipment, infrastructure, administration, salaries).
9Two provinces (Nova Scotia and New-Brunswick) have full-time kindergarten. In the other provinces it
is half-day. The Province of Ontario o¤ers half-day junior-kindergarten for four-year-olds.
10In Québec, as of September 1998, almost all 5-year-olds attended full-day kindergarten (98% compared
to 85% before the policy change).
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time period we use to evaluate the Québec policy. First, on December 31st 2000, the federal
government passed an amendment to the Employment Insurance Act which increased the
Parental Benet Program from 10 weeks to 35 weeks of paid parental leave. Since mothers,
meeting certain eligibility criteria, were already eligible to 15 weeks of paid maternity leave,
this extension e¤ectively increased parental paid leave from 25 to 50 weeks. The percentage
of mothers eligible to paid maternity and parental leave was approximately 60% at the time.
This policy obviously inuenced the number of hours in care for children aged 0 to 12 months
and the labour force participation of their mother during that rst year. We look at this age
group separately in our empirical analysis.
The second reform, taking place in 1998, is the introduction of the federal National Child
Benet Supplement (in place of a small Working Income Supplement) for low-income families
as part of the Canadian Child Tax Benet (CCTB) introduced in 1993. The National Child
Benet Supplement e¤ectively increased the benets per child paid to low-income families.
At the same time, many provinces, including the province of Québec, introduced their own
child tax benet to promote attachment to the the labour market.
Milligan and Stabile (2007) nd that this reform had a signicant positive e¤ect on the
labour supply of low-income families in Canada for ve provinces (excluding Québec) and
their overall income. Impacts were strong for single-parent families, but extremely modest
for two-parent families. We estimate the e¤ect of the Québec policy on single-parent and two-
parent families separately, and interpret our ndings on single parents in light of the NCBP
reform. Both of these reforms were enacted across Canada, with some minor variations in the
case of the NCBP. However, our empirical strategy accounts for changes that are common
to Québec and the RofC.
Québec specic reforms were also implemented during the period that may have in-
teracted with the daycare reform: a January 2005 scal reform for families with children
that included a new working income supplement to low-income households (mostly favour-
ing single-parent families working at near the minimum wage) and the enhancement of the
parental leave program in Québec implemented in January 2006. The new parental leave pol-
icy (including 5 weeks specically for fathers) mainly increases the amount paid to a parent
on leave and relaxes the eligibility criteria in the federal program by including self-employed
parents. Both the parental leave and the work income supplement lead to an increase in
disposable income for treated families. In addition, the parental leave enhancement allows
more children to stay at home with their parents in the rst year of life. We carefully inter-
pret our results in light of these other policies and explicitly identify some limitations of our
analysis.
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3 Prior research evidence on ECEC
Research on early childhood education and care has grown exponentially over the past
decade. In this section, we review some of the important contributions on the links between
maternal labour force participation, ECEC, and cognitive development. For a comprehen-
sive review of research on early childhood development we refer the readers to Almond and
Currie (2011).
On motherslabour supply and use of childcare Earlier studies nd that the Québec
experiment produced an important increase in the labour supply of mothers of eligible chil-
dren. Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008) use Statistics Canadas Survey of Labour and Income
Dynamics (SLID) annual data from 1993 to 2002. Using the sample of all Canadian mothers
with at least one child aged 1 to 5, they nd that the policy had substantial e¤ects on a
diversity of labour supply indicators (participation, labour earnings, annual weeks and hours
worked).11 Baker et al. (2008), using the rst two waves (1994-1995 and 1996-1997) and
the last two waves (2000-2001 and 2002-2003) of the NLSCY available at the time, analyze
the impact of Québecs childcare policy on formal childcare use and maternal work (mothers
in two-parent families only). Restricting their attention to preschool children aged 0 to 4,
they also show that the policy had substantial positive e¤ects on mothers employment and
non-parental childcare use.
Lefebvre et al. (2009) using data from the SLID (1996 to 2004) evaluate the potential
long-term labour supply e¤ects of Québecs universal childcare policy. They nd that the
program had substantial dynamic labour supply e¤ects on mothers in Québec, especially for
mothers who had a high probability of having a child in low-fee daycare from the childs
birth to his or her fth birthday. For example, the results show that the policy increased
annual hours worked in 2004 for mothers with at least one child aged 6 to 11 (and no child
less than 6, therefore not "directly" a¤ected by the policy) in Québec by 217 hours.12 Their
results suggest that the e¤ects were persistent over the life of a child. Clavet and Duclos
(2012) estimate a structural model of labour supply strictly with mothers from Québec and
for a single year (2004). They nd a small e¤ect of the daycare policy for mothers in two-
parent families, and a larger e¤ect for single mothers. The Baker et al. (2008) study has been
extended by Lefebvre, Merrigan and Roy-Desrosiers (2011) using waves 1 to 7 of the NLSCY.
Results show that labour supply increases with each post-reform year and age of children
for both type of families. Kottelenberg and Lehrer (2013), using the same DD approach as
Baker et al. (2008) while also adding waves 6 and 7 of the NLSCY, obtain a similar average
e¤ect over the post-policy period (11 versus 7 percentage points) for the participation rate
11In 2002, the e¤ects on participation, earnings, annual hours and weeks worked of the childcare policy
are respectively between 8.1 and 12 percentage points, $5,000 to $6,000 (2001 dollars), 231 to 270 annual
hours at work, and 5 to 6 annual weeks of work.
12Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008) nd the impact of the policy on all mothers with at least one child aged
1 to 5 to be 231 hours in 2002.
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of mothers with at least one child aged 0-4 years in two-parent families.
Surprisingly, other childcare reforms in some European countries, which led to a sizeable
expansion of publicly subsidized full-time childcare, had a modest e¤ect on maternal em-
ployment. In Norway, the replacement of informal (e.g. relatives, grand-parents, neighours)
with formal childcare in the mid 1970s had surprisingly no e¤ects on childcare use or mater-
nal labour supply (Haynes and Mogstad, 2011a). An early 1990s reform in Spain expanded
publicly subsidized childcare for 3 year-old children and were conducive to large increases of
enrollment in the following years. The reform had a modest e¤ect on maternal employment
(Nollenberger and Rodríguez-Planas, 2013), albeit in a period of depressed economic activity
(which is not the case in Québec). The results suggest that crowding out of informal care was
unlikely as most 3 year-olds whose mothers worked prior to the reform were already enrolled
in either public or private childcare. The authors interpret the e¤ects mainly as the e¤ects
of substituting maternal care by public high-quality care. Over the years 2005-2009, the
Dutch government increased childcare subsidies substantially, reducing the average e¤ective
parental fee by 50%, and extended subsidies to so-called childminder ("guestparent") care.
Moreover a substantial increase in the earned income tax credit for the same treatment
group over the same period was implemented at the same time. Bettendorf, Jongen and
Muller (2012) estimate the labour supply e¤ect of the joint reform with a DD strategy, using
parents with older children as a control group. They nd small sized impacts on maternal
labour supply (participation and hours). Fitzpatrick (2010), analyses data for three Amer-
ican states who recently introduced universal 4 year-old prekindergarten programs o¤ering
free preschool to all age-eligible children. Using restricted-access data from the Census, to-
gether with birthday-based eligibility cuto¤s, and a regression discontinuity framework, she
nds that universal pre-K availability increases statewide preschool enrollment by about 14%
but has little e¤ect on the labour supply of most mothers.
In sum, Canadian studies nd substantial positive labour supply e¤ects of the Québec
childcare policy for mothers of eligible children. All of these studies measure the short to
medium term e¤ects, up to 2006, four years after the full implementation of the program,
while this paper estimates the persistent labor supply e¤ects, up to 2009 for specic post-
reform years and sub-groups (by age of children, family type, mothers education and for
fathers). The impact of the Québec reform on mothers labour force participation stands in
stark contrast compared to impacts of similar policies implemented in other countries. These
policies are however typically narrower in terms of age coverage and size of the subsidy, which
may explain the di¤erences in impact.
On ECEC and child development Improving the cognitive skills of young children has
been suggested as a possible strategy for equalizing opportunities across socioeconomic sta-
tus levelling the playing eld and improving childrens long-run outcomes. Almond and
Currie (2011) argue that formal childcare, as opposed to parental care or informal care, may
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help reduce the importance of family background on child development and thereby favour
equal opportunity. There are several observational studies on the e¤ects of maternal employ-
ment or ECEC on child development outcomes (cognitive, behavioural, socioemotional, and
health related). We briey summarize the main evidence and refer the reader to Almond
and Currie (2011) and our Appendix for more details.
First, on children aged 0 to 2, there is a growing body of empirical results indicating
that maternal employment and time spent in childcare during the rst year of life can have
adverse e¤ects on a childs developmental outcomes (such as verbal, reading and math scores,
and indices of behavioural problems) observed at later ages (Ruhm, 2004; Waldfogel et al.,
2002; Brooks-Gunn et al., 2002; Hill et al., 2002; Hill et al. 2005; Gregg et al. 2005).
Second, for children aged 3 to 5, several studies on the e¤ect of preschool programs nd
signicant positive e¤ects on cognitive outcomes (letter-word identication, spelling and
applied problems) and measures of school readiness (Gormley and Gayer, 2005; Gormley et
al., 2005; Magnuson et al., 2007, 2004), and especially so for disadvantaged children (e.g.
Doyle et al., 2009.; Burger, 2010; Sammons et al., 2002, 2003).
Third, while the quality of care seems to have positive, but small, e¤ects on cognitive
outcomes (Blau, 1999; Duncan et al., 2003; Belsky et al. 2007), longer hours in all types of
preschool programs seem to be associated with increased behavioural problems that persist
over time (Magnuson et al., 2004, 2005; Loeb et al., 2007).
Finally, the existing American studies on full-day versus half-day kindergarten suggest
that the impact of full-day kindergarten on academic and social outcomes is mainly positive
(Lee et al., 2006; DeCicca, 2007; Zvoch et al, 2008.
In Canada, a handful of studies have investigated related questions, mainly by exploiting
the Québec daycare reform. Baker et al. (2008), using a DD approach, highlight the harmful
e¤ects of the Québec daycare policy on both parental behavior and health measures and
parent-reported behavioural scores and health indicators for children aged 0 to 4. The
authors suggest that these negative e¤ects may be temporary and associated to the rapid
expansion of the childcare system. Kottelenberg and Lehrer (2013) extend their analysis
using later waves of the NLSCY. Using the same method as Baker et al. (2008), they also nd
negative impacts on children behavioural and health measures, but non-signicant results
for father and family outcomes. Using an instrumental variables estimator (assuming the
endogeneity of childcare) to recover estimates of the local average treatment e¤ect (LATE)
of childcare attendance (i.e., the e¤ect on children in Québec with mothers who send their
child in daycare with the policy but who would not have otherwise), Kottelenberg and Lehrer
again nd mostly negative and signicant LATEs of childcare attendance on the scores used
with the DD approach.
The quandary with several of the outcomes in these two studies are their subjective
nature. In the NLSCY, the behavioural scores are constructed by Statistics Canada (using
item response theory) with a dozen of questions asked to the "Person Most Knowledgeable"
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of the child, most of the time the mother but also some other members of the family. One
may wonder whether the impact of the policy on the mothers participation in the labour
force may indirectly a¤ect their perception of problematic behaviour by the child.
On the timing of maternal labour supply, Baker and Milligan (2010 and 2011) nd that
reduced maternal labour supply in the rst year of life has no impact on cognitive and
behavioural development measured between ages 1 and 5, while Haeck (2011) nds positive
impacts on cognitive development and neutral e¤ects on behavioural development measured
at ages 4 and 5.13
In sum, it appears that high quality care contributes positively to the development of
children from less favoured family environments. The impacts on other children are mixed
and the optimal timing of entry in daycare appears to be beyond age one. This paper
contributes to the literature by further documenting the impacts of the Québec daycare
reform on childrens cognitive development at ages 4 and 5. For the rst time, the impact on
children aged 5 is estimated and all of the 8 available waves of the NLSCY are used. Children
observed in later waves were eligible to low-fee daycare as of birth and were therefore treated
more intensely than children observed in prior studies.
4 Econometric modeling
To estimate the e¤ects of the daycare reform, we rely on a non-experimental evaluation frame-
work based on multiple pre-and post-treatment periods. We use a "di¤erence-in-di¤erences"
(DD) model where the treatment group includes Québecs children before and after the re-
form and the control group includes children of the same age in the RofC observed for the
same time period. This approach is now well established to evaluate natural experiments
(Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009), but has recently raised a number of concerns (e.g. Bertrand
et al., 2004). Concerns related to our application are addressed below.
We use data from all 8 waves of the NLSCY.14 Wave 1 (1994-1995) and 2 (1996-1997) are
considered pre-treatment, while waves 3 (1998-1999) to 8 (2008-2009) are considered post-
treatment. The program was originally implemented in late 1997. Some children surveyed
in wave 2 were interviewed in 1997, but all were interviewed before the implementation of
the program. In wave 3, only children aged 3 and 4 were eligible to low-fee daycare and
the number of available spaces was fairly constrained. Starting in wave 4 (2000-2001), all
children residing in Québec were eligible. It is also around that time, that the "constraint"
on the number of low-fee spaces was loosened. In the spirit of Francesconi and Van der
Klaauw (2007), we write down a model that accounts for the relatively long implementation
period. The model is as follows:
13These authors exploit variation in the parental leave reform in Canada (excluding Québec) to identify
the impact on the child of staying out of the labour market for a longer period in the childs rst year of life.
14The data set is further discussed in the next section.
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Yij =  + Qij + I(j  s) +
8X
j=3
jWjQij + Xij + "ij: (1)
where Yij represents the outcome of child i (or the childs mother or father) in wave j. We
study the following outcomes: weekly hours in childcare, mothers (and fathers) labour force
participation and weeks worked, and the cognitive test scores of children at ages 4 and 5.
The term Qij takes the value of 1 if the child i lives in Québec in wave j, and otherwise takes
the value 0. I() is an indicator function taking the value 1 if the wave j is greater or equal to
s = 3 (1998-1999). The term  represents a change in the value of the outcome studied post
reform that is shared by both regions. To account for the progressive implementation of the
policy, a set of dummies Wj for each of the post-reform waves j = 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8 interacted
with Qij is included. This allows the e¤ect of the reform to be di¤erent over time. Between
wave 3 (1998-1999) and wave 8 (2008-2009), more than 110,000 new low-fee spaces were
created (an average of 14,000 per year). The term Xij is a vector of socioeconomic control
variables and  is a vector of parameters. This allows us to control for socioeconomic changes
in group composition. Finally, "ij is an i.i.d. error term. Assuming the e¤ects of the policy
are heterogenous, we estimate the Average Treatment on the Treated e¤ect (ATT).
To account for unobserved transitory shocks at the group level, we also implement a
two-step procedure to adjust the standard errors (Donald and Lang, 2007). E¤ectively, we
rst regress the outcome variables on a set of sixteen dummies, one for each region-wave
interaction, and Xij, while taking into account the population weights. Then, we regress
the estimated coe¢ cients of the sixteen interaction terms on a constant, a post treatment
dummy, a Québec dummy and the six interaction termsWjQij. Each observation is weighted
by the inverse of the variance of the estimated interaction term. According to Donald and
Lang, inferences should be conducted using a Students t-distribution with seven degrees of
freedom (t7-distribution), but since our group sizes are large, we follow Wooldridge (2006)
and use the standard normal distribution for inference.
For the estimation, we use di¤erent subsamples of the NLSCY waves 1 to 8 data set. We
rst selected all children aged 0 to 5. Children living in foster families are excluded as well as
those (very few) with a mother observed with missing values for the socioeconomic control
variables. This constitutes our main sample. From this sample, a number of subsamples are
created. The main sample is divided by age of the child, by maternal education (those with a
high-school diploma or less, and those with a post-secondary diploma or degree) and by type
of family (single-parent, and two-parent family). We specify in the tables of results which
subsample is used for each estimation and provide bootstrapped standard errors (including
for the two-step procedure) using the 1,000 bootstrap weights provided by Statistics Canada
to account for the complex survey design of the NLSCY.
The following sections present the empirical analysis. First, we present the data. Second,
we discuss the impact of the reform on hours of childcare and present the estimated impacts
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on labour force participation, weeks worked, and on di¤erent measures of family well-being
(e.g. income). Third, we display the results on cognitive test scores. Finally, the scal
implications of the policy are discussed in the last section.
5 Data set
We use the NLSCY, a biennial survey conducted by Statistics Canada, started in 1994-95
(wave 1) and ended in 2008-09 (wave 8).15 It asks Canadian parents a wide range of questions
on the use of childcare and their labour force participation,16 which allows us to trace their
evolution in Québec and the RofC using comparable data. The unit of analysis for the
NLSCY is the child or youth. The NLSCY not only provides information on representative
provincial samples of all children, but in contrast with administrative data, it also provides
information on both regulated and non-regulated (more informal) types of care.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for children aged 0-5 by region (Québec and
RofC) and by wave (1994 to 2008). Generally speaking, the observed characteristics are fairly
comparable across region and years, but a few di¤erences and trends are worth mentioning.
While motherseducation is comparable in 1996 in Québec and the RofC, mothers in Québec
become more educated over time with 68.6% receiving a post-secondary diploma or degree
in 2008 compared to 59.6% in the RofC. Over the entire period of observation, there are
relatively more immigrant mothers in the RofC , approximately 9 percentage points and
more mothers giving birth at 35 years of age or over, approximately 4 percentage points.
Family composition is comparable and relatively stable over time. A large fraction of children
in Québec and the RofC live in a large urban area (more than 500,000 inhabitants). Finally,
family total gross income ($2002) is higher in the RofC, but the gap is fairly stable over
time.
We showed above that the care of young children in Québec has changed in important
ways. These changes become even more dramatic when the evolution of the use of childcare in
Québec is compared with that of the RofC using the NLSCY data set. Figure 3 summarizes,
for Québec and the RofC, the four principal care arrangements used by parents for children
aged 1 to 4 from 1994 to 2008. The vertical line indicates the third wave of the survey
(1998), which corresponds to the second year of policy implementation. Prior to the daycare
reform, the care arrangements in Québec and the RofC were fairly comparable. Most children
were in parental care (around 55%). Some were in out-of-home care17 (around 25%), and a
comparable fraction (around 10%) were either in centre-based care or cared for at home but
15From here on, we refer to years instead of waves, and use only the rst year of the two-year period. As
such, we refer to 1994 for wave 1, 1996 for wave 2, and so on.
16A parent is participating in the labour force if he/she answers yes to the question "Do you currently
work?". Results are robust to the other question "Did you work in the past 12 months?".
17Out-of-home care includes family-based care (regulated or not) and care by relatives outside of the childs
home.
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not by their parents. Home care is slightly higher outside of Québec, while centre-based care
is slightly higher in Québec. Starting in 1998, the use of centre-based care increases rapidly
in Québec while parental care (and to a lesser extent out-of-home care) decreases rapidly. In
contrast, in the RofC, no such dramatic changes are noticeable. Parental care has remained
fairly stable at approximately 50% since 1998. After parental care, family-based care outside
of the childs own home remains the most widely used mode of care in the RofC for most of
the period. To summarize, the gure shows an important shift in daycare use occurring in
Québec after the introduction of the daycare policy in 1997. No comparable shift is observed
in the RofC.
Variations in care arrangements in Québec are also observed by income group. Using the
NLSCY wave 8 (2008-09) data, we document the working status of parents and childcare
use by family total current income quartile, as well as the percentage of children aged 0-59
months in di¤erent modes of care by family income quartile. Table 2 shows that quartiles
of income are highly correlated with the more formal mode of care (i.e., daycare centre).
Approximately 65% of children with parents in the highest income quartile attend daycare
centres, compared to 31% in the lowest income quartile. A high proportion of low-income
families (quartile 1) do not use childcare at all (45%). Of those who work or study, only 8%
do not use childcare in the highest income quartile, compared to 14% in the lowest income
quartile. These gures show that there are important di¤erences in care arrangements across
the income distribution. For scal year 2011-2012, the total yearly subsidy for a child aged
0 to 17 months in a not-for-prot centre is $17,913, and for a child aged 18 to 59 months
is $12,406. The average subsidies in a for-prot centre for children of the same age are
respectively of $16,037 and $11,456$. The subsidy for family-based childcare is on average
$9,000. As a result, high-income families receive (indirectly, not taking into account that they
pay higher income taxes) a disproportionate share of the total subsidy to the program not
only because they use childcare services more, but also because they use the more expensive
type of childcare services. As not-for-prot centres generally o¤er a higher quality18 of
service, these ndings raise the question of vertical equity, both in terms of quality and
quantity of services received.
The change in care arrangements is also combined with a change in the intensity of care.
Figure 4 presents the mean hours (conditional and non conditional on the use of childcare)
per week children spend in their primary care arrangement in Québec and the RofC. Non
conditionally, prior to the childcare reform, children aged 1 to 4 in both regions spent on
average 11 to 12 hours per week in childcare. Starting in 1998, the average hours children
spend in daycare in Québec starts to increase and continues to do so for the entire period of
18On quality see ISQ (2004) and Japel et al. (2005). These studies show that the average quality in 2003
in Québecs subsidized daycare network was at best satisfactory and in many cases the level of quality was
low or not acceptable, particularly for children in lower-income families. The ISQ report shows that a higher
proportion of not-for-prot centres o¤er good or very good quality, more than 40%, compared to only 19%
in family-based care and 11% in for-prot centres.
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observation. By 2008, children in Québec spend on average 23 hours per week in daycare,
while children in the RofC spend 12 to 13 hours. Conditional on attending daycare, we nd
that children in Québec prior to the reform were already in care for longer hours, 29 to 30
hours compared to 27 hours in the RofC. This di¤erence becomes even more striking as the
reforms implementation progresses. By 2006-2008, children in Québec attending daycare
spend on average 33 hours per week in daycare compared to 28 hours in the RofC. This
gure shows that not only more children started to attend daycare in Québec following the
reform, but the intensity of care for those attending daycare also increased.
To summarize, the gures presented so far show important shifts in daycare use, modes,
and intensity occurring in Québec after the introduction of the childcare policy in 1997,
but not in the RofC. These important shifts are coupled with a greater use of the more
expensive and higher quality modes of care by high-income families, which necessarily raise
the question of the vertical equity of the program, also addressed by Duclos (2006).
6 Results on hours of care and parental labour force
participation
Children aged 1 to 4 and family structure We start by providing evidence on the
e¤ects of the program on hours of care and parental labour force for children aged 1 to 4, by
type of family (all families, two-parent families, and single-parent families) for waves 3 to 8.
Here, we simply extend the observation period, relative to former studies, to observe whether
the leading e¤ects identied by previous studies are persistent. Compared to previous work
which had analysed participation in chilcare, we add some results on the occurrence and
intensity of care using hours in care both conditionally and unconditionally on attending
any form of non-parental care.
Table 3 shows the estimated e¤ects of the policy. Our evaluation strategy relies on
equation (1), where Yij is the number of hours per week spent in the primary mode of care
for child i in wave j including zero hours (columns 1 to 4, top panel) and excluding zero hours
(columns 5 to 8, top panel), the current labour force participation of the mother (columns
1 to 4, bottom panel) and the number of weeks worked by the mother in the reference year
(columns 5 to 8, bottom panel). Columns 4 and 8, denoted by "#", are computed with the
two-step procedure detailed in the previous section. The socioeconomic controls Xij include
the sex of the child, child age dummies, the age group of the mother at child birth (25-29,
30-34, 35 or more with 14-24 the omitted group), the family type (step-family, single-parent,
with two-parent family the omitted group), a dummy for whether the mother was born in
Canada or not, the mothers highest level of education (less than a high school diploma,
high school diploma, some post-secondary education, trade or college diploma or with a
university diploma or more the omitted group), the presence of siblings (older, younger or
same age, no sibling omitted) and other children, and the size of the community of residence
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(ve groups from rural to 500,000 habitants, more than 500,000, the omitted group). These
characteristics are presented in Table 1 for children aged 0 to 5 for both regions.
For unconditional hours of care (including zero hours), the e¤ects increase substantially
from 1998 to 2008, from 2.0 to 10.8 hours for the 1-4 age group (column 3). As new spaces
are created every year during this period, it is not surprising to nd that the e¤ects are
generally increasing over time. The rst two columns of the table reveal that the e¤ects are
slightly larger for children living in a single-parent family (3.5 to 14.2 hours) compared to
children living in a two-parent family (1.9 to 10.4 hours). In general, the estimation shows
that the e¤ect increases from 1998 to 2008 reecting the addition of new low-fee spaces.
From these results, it is clear that from 2004 to 2008 children were more exposed to daycare.
These e¤ects are largely signicant and remain so once we account for unobserved aggregate
transitory shocks (column 4).19 These e¤ects must be considered very large and represent a
dramatic change in the lives of children in Québec.
The unconditional number of hours certainly increased due to the higher rate of partic-
ipation in daycare post reform (see Figure 3), but also possibly due to the longer hours of
services o¤ered by the subsidized providers. To see whether children in care were there for
longer hours post reform, we estimate the impact on hours of care conditional on attending
daycare (i.e., we now exclude children with zero hours of care from our sample). We nd that
conditionally, children in any type of family spend more time in care post reform: 1.8 hours
more per week in 1998 to 3.3 hours in 2008. The e¤ect is largest in 2004 at 5 hours per week.
Similar patterns can be observed by family type, but while the e¤ects remain signicant for
children in two-parent families, they are not for children in single-parent families.
Figure 5 presents descriptive statistics for children aged 1 to 4 from the eight waves of the
NLSCY on the labour force participation of mothers (in single and two-parent families) and
fathers (in two-parent families). The main changes are for mothers. In two-parent families
in Québec, motherslabour supply increases in most waves, starting at 55 percentage points
in 1994 and reaching 76 percentage points in 2008. In the RofC, the participation of mothers
is fairly stable at around 65 percentage points. For single mothers, there are large increases
for both Québec and the RofC, but the original gap, in favour of mothers in the RofC is
totally closed by 2008 where the participation rate is exactly 53 percentage points in Québec
and the RofC. For weeks worked, we observe the same patterns.20 For mothers in two-parent
families, the descriptive statistics suggest that there were no changes in the RofC, while the
number of weeks worked increased by 7 weeks in Québec over the period.
Table 3 further shows that for the 1 to 4 year-old group taken as a whole (columns 3
and 4, bottom panel), the e¤ects on labour force participation are large and signicant. The
smallest e¤ect, 6 percentage points in the participation rate, is in 1998. As of 2000, the e¤ects
are already twice as large (11 percentage points), in line with the addition of new low-fee
19These e¤ects remain signicant even if we use the more restrictive t7-distribution for inference.
20See Figure A2 in the Appendix for more details.
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spaces. The e¤ect slightly increases up to 13 percentage points by 2008. Columns1 and 2
present the results for mothers by family structure. The e¤ects for mothers in a two-parent
family are all signicant, large and increasing. For single mothers, the e¤ect is very large in
wave 3, and remains high until 2008. This may be in part due to the smaller sample size for
this group, but may also reect the role played by other policies impacting single parents
over the period, such as the NCBP supplement of 1998 and the specic adjustments to this
supplement in Québec. The measure of labour force participation which is participation at
the time of the survey is "bumpier" than annual weeks worked. Indeed, as shown below,
the year to year increase in annual weeks worked is more in line with the increase in low-
fee childcare spaces, but the standard errors are relatively larger. We will return to this
discussion when we present the results by the education of the mother.
The standard labour supply model predicts that mothers active in the labour market
(with or without the low-fee program) could decrease their number of weeks worked with
the low-fee program due the income e¤ect. In addition to the income e¤ect, as documented
above, the low-fee daycare program also resulted in a large increase in the labour force
participation of mothers. This positively impacts the number of weeks worked, as a large
fraction of mothers move from working zero weeks to a positive number of weeks. Since the
labour force e¤ect is so large, we expect this e¤ect to dominate the income e¤ect, and thus
to observe positive e¤ects on weeks worked. Columns 5 to 8 of the bottom panel of Table 3
presents the results for annual weeks worked. We observe that for the 1 to 4-year-olds there
is a sustained positive policy e¤ect from 2000 to 2008. In terms of family structure, again the
main e¤ects on weeks worked are observed for mothers in two-parent families, mirroring the
e¤ects for participation. For both labour force participation and weeks worked, the results
are robust to the correction of standard errors using the two-step procedure. As mentioned
earlier, the e¤ects for single mothers is in line with the policy but are not signicant.
In sum, the e¤ects are generally positive and signicant on hours in care. In contrast
with previous work that focused on participation in daycare, this further shows that not only
does participation increase, but so does the number of hours in care, conditional on attending
daycare. In line with previous work, we also nd that maternal labour force participation
and weeks are impacted positively by the reform, and we further show that these e¤ects
are persistent up until 2008 and are generally increasing over time. More importantly, we
nd strong but imprecisely estimated e¤ects for single mothers. Given the high cost to the
government of this particular group in terms of transfers, this result is very important.
Hours of care by age We now present the e¤ects of the reform by age of the child as
well as analyzing the e¤ects by family structure and maternal education. We start with
hours of care, and then present the results related to the labour supply of mothers. To
better grasp the interaction between the parental leave reform and the daycare reform, we
separate children aged 0 in two groups: those aged 0 to 5 months and those aged 6 months
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or more. Also, we analyse age 5 children eligible for kindergarten separately from same age
children not age-eligible for kindergarten. This allows us to estimate the e¤ect of the full-day
kindergarten policy. Table 4 shows the estimated e¤ects of the policy on weekly hours in
childcare by age (from 0 to 5). We start with the e¤ect on hours of care not conditional on
attending daycare (top panel) and then present the e¤ect on hours of care conditional on
attending daycare (bottom panel).
For children aged 5 months or less, the e¤ect of the low-fee daycare program is not
signicant (except for 2004 where it is negative and weakly signicant).21 One main feature
of Québecs family programs explains these results. Long before the daycare reform was
implemented, working Canadian mothers became eligible to a total of 25 weeks of paid leave
to stay at home and care for their children. As a result, in Québec, children aged 5 months
or less are largely taken care of by their mothers whether she is active in the labour market
or not. Even after the implementation of the daycare program, mothers continue to stay at
home in the rst few months of their childs life. The daycare program did not impact infants
aged 0 to 5 months. For children aged 6 months or more, the e¤ects are di¤erent. First, the
impact is positive and weakly signicant in 1998 (3.3 hours), positive and largely signicant
in 2000 and 2002 (6.4 and 7.4 hours), and not signicant from 2004 onwards. In 1998,
newborn children were not eligible to low-fee daycare and paid parental leave only lasted 25
weeks (slightly less than 6 months). The weak positive e¤ect may reect a desire for parents
to secure a space in low-fee daycare as several providers expected to be subsidized given
government announced implementation plan in this regard. At the time, the importance of
securing a place early on and the timeline of eligibility for children aged 0 to 5 was largely
advertised by the government. In 2000, children were now eligible for low-fee daycare and
the parental leave was still limited to 25 weeks. The large positive e¤ect is therefore not
surprising. The e¤ect in 2002, however, is surprising as this coincides with the extension of
the Canadian federally funded parental leave policy. While children aged 0 and 1 in 2000
were born prior to the parental leave extension, those of 2002 were born after. Parents of
2002 children (under certain conditions) now had the possibility to stay at home in the rst
year of their childs life for 50 weeks compared to 25 weeks before. The large e¤ect on hours
of care (7.4 hours) reects both the reduction in hours of care in the RofC following the
parental leave reform and the increase in hours of care in Québec. Again, the increase in
Québec most likely reects the need to secure a space in low-fee daycare at a time when the
number of spaces was limited, especially for this age group. As of 2004, the e¤ects on hours
of care vanishes as Québec children also start to stay at home for a longer period. As the
number of spaces increase, the need to secure a space early decreases and mothers can take
advantage of the extended parental leave to care for their children.
For ages 1 to 4, we nd that the number of hours spent in care is increasing during the
21As of 2000, the number of children aged less than 5 months is extremely small in the NLSCY. The results
must be interpreted with some caution.
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period across all age groups. It is generally not signicant in 1998 when children aged 0 to 2
are not eligible and the number of spaces is still relatively constrained. At the beginning of
the program, existing spaces are converted to low-fee spaces such that eligible children not
already in care could not easily be included in low-fee daycare (see Figure 1).
For children aged 5 not yet age-eligible for kindergarten, we nd that hours of care
increased signicantly as a result of the daycare reform. As of 2000, these children spend
6.2 hours more in daycare per week, by 2008 they spend 16.2 hours more. This e¤ect is
very large. The larger e¤ects are found in 2006 and 2008 (16.7 and 16.2 hours respectively).
These children were the rst to be eligible for low-fee daycare since birth. For age 5 children
age-eligible for kindergarten, the e¤ects are negative and signicant as early as 1998. As
these children switched from half-day kindergarten to full-day kindergarten (as of 1998),
they only attended daycare before- and after-school (if they did at all). This e¤ect is more
or less constant and ranges from 4 to 5 hours per week between 1998 and 2008.
Again (bottom panel of Table 4), to measure the impact on the intensity of care for
children attending daycare, we now discuss the e¤ects of the reform on the sample of children
with a positive number of hours in care (i.e., hours > 0).22 We focus on children aged 1 to 5,
because the samples are too small for children aged 0 (especially in the RofC following the
parental leave reform). While the intensity of care does not signicantly increase for children
aged 1 and 2, it increases for age 3 to 5 children not yet in school. The e¤ects are larger
the older the child, and especially so from 2004 onwards. Age 3 children spend on average
4 more hours per week in care, post reform, while age 4 children spend as much as 8 more
hours per week and age 5 children (not yet in school) spend 11 more hours. Not only did the
number of children in care increase, but also the intensity of care for age 3 to 5 children. For
age 5 children in school, the number of hours in care (conditional on using non-parental care)
decreases substantially as of 1998 (8.8 hours per week). This reects the implementation of
full-day kindergarten as of 1998. Age 5 children in school attend kindergarten all day, and
are in care only before- and after-school. Not surprisingly, they spend considerably less time
in care: their hours of care decrease by 8.8 hours in 1998 up to 11.1 hours in 2008.
We estimated this specication with the subsample of children whose mother has a high
school diploma or less and the subsample of children whose mother has a post-secondary
diploma or degree.23 We nd that the e¤ects are larger for children of highly educated
mothers, but clearly positive for both groups with children aged 1 to 4. The results by
age group for children of less educated mothers are slightly less stable, probably due to
the smaller sample size. But for the aggregated group of 1 to 4-year-olds, the e¤ects are
increasing, though small and not signicant in 1998. These results suggest that less educated
mothers responded to the low-fee incentive less quickly, which further suggests that highly
22The estimate should be downward biased because the post-treatment sample should on average contain
more mothers with a lower attachment to the labour market.
23The results are presented in Appendix Table A.2. Post-secondary degree includes college, trade and
university.
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educated mothers had an "early advantage". This may not be surprising if we assume that
highly educated mothers have the most to lose, in terms of career advancement, from a
prolonged absence from the job market. The di¤erence between the estimated e¤ects on
highly educated mothers and less educated mothers is even more striking when looking at
single mothers. Educated single mothers beneted most from the reform. The e¤ects are
very large for post-secondary educated mothers.
In sum, regardless of the education of the mother, children from 2004 to 2008 were more
intensely a¤ected by the program than children observed earlier on, which is consistent with
the increased number of low-fee spaces.
Motherslabour force participation For labour force participation, the top panel of
Table 5 shows the evolution of the impact of the reform by age group. For mothers of
children aged 5 months or less, the impact is generally not signicant, except for 2002 when
it is large and negative and 2006 when it is large and positive. As mothers of these children
were generally eligible to paid maternity leave before and after the reform, we expect no
e¤ects over the period. For mothers of children aged 6 months or more, we nd that they
increase their labour force participation early in the program (1998 to 2002), but while the
e¤ect remains fairly large in 2004 (0.09) it is not signicant. As of 2006, the e¤ect completely
vanishes. This coincides with the enhancement of the Québec parental leave program, which
relaxed the eligibility criteria and increased the amount paid to mothers on leave. This
reform reversed the labour supply e¤ect initiated by the daycare reform for mothers with
newborns (less than 1 year-old).
For children aged 1 and 2, not eligible for low-fee daycare in 1998, it is surprising to
observe strong e¤ects for mothers of these children in 1998, but in line with the policy
implementation to see a jump as of 2000. As mentioned above, the fact that new low-fee
spaces would eventually open up and also cover younger children was well advertised by the
government in the early years of the program. As there was a very strong incentive to secure
a space early to reap benets from the policy for as many years as possible, it is possible
that parents simply rushed into the labour market assuming that they would soon nd a
space in low-fee daycare for their child. This incentive was lower for mothers with older
children as the benets of the new policy lasted for a much shorter time. This is conrmed
by the non-signicant e¤ect on labour force participation of mothers with a 3 or 4 year-old
in 1998. As of 2000, the e¤ects for mothers with a child aged 1 to 4 are generally positive,
large, signicant and increasing over time.
The e¤ects on the labour force participation of mothers with a child aged 5 not yet age-
eligible for kindergarten are generally not signicant, except for 2006 (0.17). The number of
weeks worked is however increasing over time, following a pattern similar to the number of
hours of care for this group. While the number of hours of care was larger for these children,
their mothers did not participate more in the labour market. Mothers of age 5 children
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eligible for kindergarten increased their labour force participation as of 2004 (0.11), but
these children e¤ectively spent less time in daycare. What is particular of the children from
the later waves is that the number of childcare spaces available is substantially higher for
them since birth. Therefore, the positive (and sometimes signicant) e¤ects at age ve in the
later waves could be due to the availability of low-fee spaces since birth. Therefore, simply
changing kindergarten policy from a part-time to a full-time system may not be enough to
increase the labour supply of mothers with a 5-year-old if it is not combined with a daycare
policy for the very young. This is in line with previous ndings in Fitzpatrick (2010) on the
impact of adding one more year of full-time schooling (in this case prekindergarten).
Table A.3 presents the results for mothers with a high school diploma or less (panel one)
and with a post-secondary diploma or degree (panel two). We report the results for children
aged 5 months or less for completeness but do not comment on them as the extremely
small number of observations casts doubts on the reliability of the estimated e¤ects for
that subgroup. Starting with mothers with a high school degree or less, we nd that the
estimated e¤ects are generally not signicant by age group, except for children aged 2. By
family type, we nd that they are also not signicant for single mothers, but they are large
and signicant for mothers in two-parent families. For highly educated mothers, the evidence
is fairly di¤erent. The e¤ects are large and signicant in all subgroups, except for children
aged 0 (6 months or more) and children aged 5 not in school who show positive but not
signicant e¤ects (most likely because of the smaller sample size). By family type, the
e¤ects are larger for single mothers than for mothers in two-parent families. These ndings
suggest that the benets of the reform for single mothers are very di¤erent depending on their
level of education. This may be, in part, explained by the strong link between education and
income, combined with the available childcare subsidy to low-income families prior to the
reform. Before the reform, low-income families were eligible to a childcare subsidy making
the net cost of daycare comparable to the post-reform cost. As a result, for these families,
which include a fair number of single-parent families with a low level of education, the low-fee
daycare did not imply a particularly strong monetary incentive. In contrast, prior to the
reform highly educated mothers with high potential earnings were not eligible to the childcare
subsidy. For them, the implementation of low-fee daycare thus constituted a strong incentive
to return rapidly to the labour market. It could also be that labour market skills are low
for those with less education making them much less attractive for employers. Finally, the
1998 and 2005 child benet reforms increased the incentive to work in particular for single
mothers, so that both may have played a part in considerably boosting participation for
single mothers.
The pattern for weeks worked by the mother is consistent with those of labour force
participation. Weeks worked is measured over the past 12 months and includes weeks on
paid maternity or parental leave. We nd that although the impacts are not signicant for
age 0 children, they are generally positive. For the 1- to 4-year-olds we generally nd positive
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and signicant e¤ects in line with the previous nding on labour force participation. While
we observe a monotonic increase from 1998 to 2008 for children aged 2 to 4, the pattern for
age 1 children is also increasing at rst, but decreasing as of 2004, and not signicant as
of 2006. This may be attributed to the Québec parental leave reform, which increased the
benet paid to mothers and reduced the eligibility criteria. As of January 2006, mothers of
a newborn in Québec receive a more generous parental leave benet and their job continues
to be protected for up to 70 weeks. They can a¤ord to work a few weeks less early on in
their childs life. Finally for the 5-year-olds, there are generally no signicant e¤ects, but
the e¤ects are positive as of 2004 for children in school, and as of 2006 for children not yet
in school. This is in line with the above nding on labour force participation and further
suggests that full-day kindergarten alone is not enough to raise the labour force participation
of mothers with children aged 5.
The results by education and type of household (panels three and four of Table A3) mimic
quite closely those found on participation. For mothers with a high school diploma or less
(third panel) and children aged 1 to 4, the policy also has mainly positive but not signicant
e¤ects. These e¤ects are generally smaller (and less signicant) than for the well educated
(fourth panel). When we compare the results for mothers in two-parent households with
those of single mothers, we nd that they are in line with the di¤erentiated e¤ects found
on labour force participation. Lower educated single mothers generally did not react to the
reform, while highly educated single mothers not only reacted to the reform, but did so more
strongly than highly educated mothers in two-parent families (14.4 weeks compared to 5.5
weeks in 2008).
In sum, we nd that the e¤ects on hours of care, labour force participation and weeks
worked are stronger in the early years of the reform for children aged 6 months or more,
generally increasing in time for children aged 1 to 4, and positive in the later years for children
aged 5 not yet eligible to kindergarten. Age 5 children in the later waves were eligible to
low-fee daycare since birth. Because of the implementation of full-day kindergarten, the
e¤ects on hours of care are negative and signicant in all years for children eligible for
kindergarten, and positive on labour force participation in later waves which suggests that
low-fee daycare (as opposed to full-day kindergarten) triggered these e¤ects. Post-secondary
educated mothers have responded more strongly to the reform, and single mothers with
post-secondary education even more so. In line with the progressive implementation of the
reform the evidence presented here suggests that the e¤ect is increasing with the number of
subsidized spaces.
Fathers labour force participation and weeks worked There is no evidence to our
knowledge on the impact of daycare reforms on fatherslabour force participation. Figure 5
presents descriptive statistics for children aged 1-4 from the eight waves of the NLSCY on
labour force participation of fathers (in two-parent families). From 1998 to 2008, the changes
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of the two indicators are marginal: labour supply is high at around 93 percentage points.
For weeks worked, we observe the same patterns.24 Table 6 shows the estimated e¤ects
on fathers(in two-parent families) labour force participation (top panel) and annual weeks
worked (bottom panel). For each age group, the e¤ects are rarely signicant and relatively
small. These results are also robust to the two-step procedure accounting for unobserved
transitory shocks.25 Looking at weeks worked (second panel, Table 6), we nd that over the
years, fathers have barely changed their number of weeks worked. Interestingly, in cycle 8,
the e¤ect on weeks is for fathers with a child less than 6 month is around minus 6 weeks,
corresponding to the additional 5 weeks of paid leave that is available strictly since 2006 for
fathers residing in Québec.
7 Results on family income, welfare receipt, poverty
and family structure
The NLSCY data sets also provide information on family income, parental earnings, likeli-
hood of welfare receipt, poverty and changes in family structure. Since these indicators of
well-being are impacted by a large number of factors such as the changes in income taxes,
family credits and transfer policies (important at both levels of government), we did not
produce estimates on these measures. However, for each indicator, we graphed the changes
over time for the same sample of children aged 1-4, by family type and region (Québec,
RofC).
Figure 6 shows total mean income ($2002) from all sources before taxes for Québec and
the RofC by family type. For two-parent families, the $6,700 income gap in 1994 in favour
of RofC families has increased up to $13,700 in 1998, and then decreased back to $6,700
in 2008. This suggests that pre reform the income gap between Québec and the RofC was
increasing, but started to decline as of 2000 when the daycare reform really kicked in and
mothers in Québec started to increase their labour force participation. For single-mother
families, the $4,500 income gap in 1994 in favour of RofC families gradually decreases over
the post reform period to almost $0 in 2008. This also corroborates our results on labour
force participation and weeks worked for single mothers, especially for the well educated.
The NLSCY, as of wave 3, also provides information on earnings for mothersand fathers,
which was not available for total income.26 Generally, for both two-parent and single-parent
families, the earnings gap between regions has evolved in a similar way as the total income
gap discussed above. The breakdown between mothers and fathers earnings in two-parent
families however reveals that while Québec mothers earnings have increased relative to RofC
mothers, Québec fathers earnings have decreased relative to RofC fathers. More specically,
24See Figure A2 in the Appendix for more details.
25These estimates can be obtained from the authors on request.
26These descriptive statistics can be obtained from the authors on request.
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we nd that the average earnings gap between mothers in Québec versus the RofC has
reversed over the years, from $1,200 in favour of RofC mothers to $3,400 in favour of Québec
mothers. This implies that by 2008, relative to 1998, mothers in Québec earned $4,600 more
compared to mothers in the RofC. This is consistent with Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008). At
the same time, the earnings of Québec fathers remained stable over the period, while that
of RofC fathers increased by about $2,500. The average earnings gap between fathers in the
RofC versus Québec has increased from $4,900 in 1998 to $7,400 in 2008 in favour of RofC
fathers. As a result, the family gap did not change as much as Québec mothers earnings
relative to RofC mothers.
This evidence suggests that the childcare policy had a positive impact on the earnings of
mothers in two-parent and single-parent families, but in real terms the monetary resources
of families with very young children have scaled-up in both Québec and the RofC. Because
there is a positive impact of the policy on mothers earnings and no impact on fathers
participation or weeks worked, we propose three reasons for the small impact on family
income (two-parent families). First annual earnings are increasing faster for fathers in the
RofC; second there may be a relative decrease in the weekly hours (unavailable in this data
set) worked for fathers in Québec; third, the increase in mothers earnings reduces transfers
(unavailable in this data set for waves 1-3) based on the lowest income in the household.
Figure 7 displays the percentage of families receiving welfare benets in the reference
year by region and family type. This percentage is very low for two-parent families. In
Québec, we observe a percentage of 7.5 in 1994, compared with 5.7 for the RofC. By 2008,
the percentage had fallen to 3.0 in Québec and 2.7 in the RofC, almost completely closing
the gap between Québec and the RofC. For single-parent mothers the drop in percentage
points has been dramatic: from 68% in 1994 to less than 40% in 2008 for both regions.
From 2004, the decline has been more pronounced in Québec, but it is not clear from the
previous results (section 6) if these changes are closely linked to labour force participation,
weeks worked or earnings that might have been inuenced by the childcare policy or the other
policies mentioned above. An alternative explanation lies with the 2005 Québec family policy
which introduced a work income supplement that may have increased participation. Figure 8
reports the percent of families under Statistics Canada yearly Low-Income Cut O¤ (LICOs),
a poverty threshold. The percentage of two-parent families in both regions under the LICOs
has been going down: from 18 to 9 percentage points in Québec and from 16 to 12 in the
RofC, but the changes are in unison except from 2006 to 2008 in Québec were a large drop
is observed, suggesting that the childcare policy was not a major factor in the poverty rate
drop o¤. For single-parent mothers, the same LICOs pattern prevails for both regions with
a similar 20 percentage point decline in the likelihood of being under the LICOs.
We have also examined if the percentages of children by family type (two-parent, single-
parent, step-family) have changed over time, but did not nd major changes (Table 1 shows
that for children aged 0 to 5, the proportion living in a two-parent family in 2008 is slightly
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higher than in 1994, but this pattern also holds true for the RofC).
8 Fiscal benets of the policy
We now turn to the scal benets of the childcare policy. By increasing the labour supply
of mothers with young children the policy has increased the tax base for both the provincial
and federal governments. Also, given that tax credits decrease with netfamily (taxable)
income, both federal and provincial transfers should be lower as a result of the policy. We
simulated the scal benets of the policy for the year 2004. This year is chosen because the
program was fully implemented and the year after (in 2005) an earned income tax credit
policy for low-income families participating the labour market was introduced in Québec.27
We use Statistics Canadas SLID data set which provides information on income sources,
taxes, credits, and transfers for an individual and for the family. In line with the results
of Lefebvre et al. (2009) based on the SLID, we suppose that the policy increased the
participation rate of mothers who have at least one child aged 1 to 11 by 10 percentage
points.
To compute the scal impacts we use the software written by Milligan (2008). We
rst simulate the income taxes and transfers for all working mothers and then subtract the
simulated income taxes and transfers assuming that 10% of mothers leave the labour market
(corresponding to the counterfactual no daycare policy). The question then becomes which
mothersearnings are set to zero? The benets to the government of increased labour force
participation are most likely a positive function of the earnings of the mothers reacting to
the policy change. To estimate the benets of the daycare program to the government,
we perform a number of simulations by changing the labour force participation of di¤erent
subsets of mothers. This allows us to bound the benets to the government.
E¤ectively, we rst order mothers based on their earnings, while keeping only mothers
with positive earnings in our data set. Taking into account the population weight of each
mother, we set the earnings to 0 for a number of earners that correspond to 10 percent of our
sample (reducing the participation rate by 10 percentage points, this corresponds of course
to more than 10% of earners), and we run our rst simulation. In the second simulation,
we move the 10% window by ve observations, such that in our next sample, we set to zero
again the earnings of a number of earners that correspond to 10 percent of our sample, while
retaining the observed earnings of the ve lowest paid mothers. In the third simulation, we
move again the 10% window by ve observations, and so forth. We repeat this procedure 85
times until the 10% window reaches the very top of the earnings distribution. As such, in the
sample used to compute the last simulation, the top earners (corresponding to 10 percent of
the sample) have their earnings set to zero.
27More specically, as of January 2005, the wage subsidy replaced an extremely targeted wage assistance
program. Also at the same time, the non-refundable tax credit for dependent children, the family allowances
and the tax reduction for families were replaced by a single enhanced child tax benet.
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The results are presented in Figure 9. The gure shows the aggregate increase in income
taxes and the aggregate decrease in credits and transfers for both level of governments
(provincial: Québec and federal: Canada). The x-axis represents the simulation number,
with simulation zero being the one which excludes mothers with the lowest earnings and
simulation eighty-ve being the one which excludes the highest earning mothers. At the
provincial level (Québec), this gure shows that the transfers to families decrease due to
the increased participation rate in all simulations. The amounts range from approximately
-10 to -50 million dollars. The decrease is however not monotonic. Wealthy mothers at the
provincial level are in families that receive fewer credits and transfers if they do not work. The
decrease at the federal level (Canada) is however monotonic. The income threshold for credits
and transfers is much higher at the federal level. The amounts range from approximately
-40 million to almost -120 million dollars. Therefore, the credits decreased between 50 and
approximately 170 million dollars when we combine both level of governments.
In terms of income taxes, the increase at the provincial level (also shown in Figure 9)
starts at about 50 million and increases more or less monotonically up to 450 million, and
from 50 to 550 million at the federal level. The overall gains from income taxes range
from 100 to 1,000 million dollars. The total benets to the government (including increased
income taxes and reduced credits and transfers) are between 60 to 500 million dollars at the
provincial level, and 90 to 670 million dollars at the federal level. As such, the combined
total benets range between 150 million and 1.2 billion dollars.
For scal year 2004-2005, the scal credits devoted to the program were 1.4 billion dollars.
For the same year, families paid to daycare providers approximately $345 million dollars
(189,380 subsidized spaces times 52 weeks times $35 per week). Families supported around
20% of the total cost (1,745 millions). For year 2010-2011, this ratio decreased to 15.6%. As
such, at the Québec government level, even in the best case scenario, the costs were larger
than the benets (1.7 billion versus 500 million). When we look at both levels of government,
and again assume the best case scenario, the costs are only slightly larger than the scal
benets (1.7 billion dollars versus 1.2 billion). For more realistic cases, the gains are likely to
be relatively small compared to the costs. For example, if it is the median wage earners who
are enticed by the policy to enter the labour market, then the scal gains for the provincial
government are less than 200 million dollars. However, since 2005, the family credits for
low-income families in Québec are higher, therefore the aggregate savings from transfers are
probably higher as of 2005.
Other possible gains could be accounted for, such as those from inducing mothers on
welfare to move into the labour market, and those associated with getting childcare workers
to report their earnings, but these would be fairly small as individuals on welfare typically do
not earn high income when they return to work and daycare workers do not pay considerable
amounts of taxes. As such, even then the policy seems very costly. Furthermore, previous
research documented harmful e¤ects of the childcare policy on early childhood developmental
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measures (before age 5). We pursue this line of research by investigating whether the e¤ects
have persisted over time (up to 2009) and whether they persist up to age 5 at the time of
school entry using additional developmental measures.
9 Child cognitive development tests
Using the NLSCY data on 4 and 5-year-olds, we estimate the impact of the reform on three
cognitive tests: the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), the Who Am I?test (WAI),
and the Number Knowledge test (NK). These tests may be used to measure school readiness
for children in these age groups. We rst provide a brief overview of each of the three tests
(details are presented in Appendix) and then discuss the results. The PPVT is a widely
used measure in the literature on early childhood development (Mayer, 1997). It measures
the listening comprehension for spoken words in standard English (French for children with
French as their mother tongue). The WAI measures the childs understanding and use of
conventional symbols, and early learning skills such as the ability to reproduce a gure. The
NK test assesses the childs understanding of whole numbers.
PPVT The NLSCY master les provide both the PPVT raw (PPVT-Raw) and the PPVT
standardized (PPVR-SD) scores. Statistics Canada has used di¤erent methodologies to stan-
dardize the scores over time. The released PPVT-SD scores for waves 1 to 3 are standardized
within wave (with slight variations in the methodology), while for waves 4 to 8 scores are
standardized over the grand population of all tests over the rst 5 waves of data. In waves
1 to 3, scores within wave are standardized by age group to have the same mean of 100 and
standard deviation of 15. This type of standardization is common for analysis of domains
within a wave; however it provides limited insight for in-between wave analysis. For robust-
ness and to allow analysis of changes through time (to capture true population di¤erences
over time and not simply di¤erences resulting from sampling error), we have re-standardized
(using Statistics Canada smoothing routine) the PPVT-Raw scores using all 8 waves of the
NLSCY (as of now PPVT will refer to this standardized score).28 We selected all children
aged 4 and 5 from the data sets of all 8 waves.
It is important to point out that this section is not about the evaluation of the e¤ects
of childcare on the development of children, but an evaluation of the e¤ects of a low-fee for
long-hours daycare policy on child development. Non-experimental studies that attempt to
estimate the e¤ects of childcare on child outcomes are plagued by problems of identication
and spurious correlation. First, because most children who are in daycare have working
mothers, regression methods have di¢ culty disentangling the e¤ects of non-parental daycare
28Following the approach of Statistics Canada, the standardization was done separately for the PPVT
and the EVIP (the acronym for the French adaptation of the test). This should be of no concern as our
estimates are based on di¤erences in changes of scores over time between the children of Québec, more than
80% French speaking, and those from the RofC or Ontario.
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relative to parental daycare from the e¤ects of having a working mother relative to a mother
staying at home. Second, because using childcare is a choice, it is a function of unobservable
preferences that can also determine the cognitive performance of children. For example,
mothers who stay home with their child may in general prefer spending long hours with
their child which could be benecial to the child. On the other hand, some mothers with
very low levels of human capital do not work and do not use childcare, and their children
score poorly on cognitive tests on average. These type of biases are not present in our
analysis given that we are estimating the impact of the policy and not daycare attendance.
Again, we estimate the model presented in equation (1). However, since a large proportion
of children aged 4 and 5 were not treated by the reform in 1998, we considered that children
aged 4 to 5 in 1998 were pre-reform.
The estimated e¤ects on the PPVT score are presented in Table 7.29 We rst discuss
the results of the policy on 4-year-old children (columns 1 to 4 of Table 7), then on 5-year-
olds (columns 5 to 12). For the full sample of children aged 4, we nd that the e¤ects
measured by the PPVT (column 1) are negative, but generally not signicant. They also
tend to be larger in later years, as could be expected, since a larger fraction of children
are treated and for a longer period. When we separate the sample by the education level
of the mothers, the negative e¤ects become much larger for children with low-educated
mothers, reaching a signicant level of -4.1 in 2002 and -7.7 in 2008 (almost half of a standard
deviation). Strangely the 2006 estimate for this group is null (0.06), however there are only 44
observations in Québec in 2006. The coe¢ cients for children with a post-secondary educated
mother (column 2) is usually small, negative and never signicant.
Children in Ontario provide an interesting comparison group as the province o¤ers half-
day kindergarten to 4 year-olds. When they are used as a control group, we nd again
non-signicant e¤ects that are somewhat smaller in magnitude (column 4). Although not
presented here, we have checked whether the inclusion of certain control variables were key
to our results and found that the results are extremely similar whether they are included or
not. Clearly, the policy has no positive e¤ects on age 4 children. The signs generally suggest
negative e¤ects, stronger for children of low-educated mothers.
Turning to the 5-year-olds not of school age (columns 5 to 8), we nd larger negative
e¤ects but they remain not signicant. The large negative and signicant e¤ect in 2000
is surprising as these children were not eligible from a very early age to low-fee daycare.
Although they were not yet eligible from the start, estimates of the cumulative e¤ects on
hours of care between age 1 and 5 (column 2, Table A.4) show that these children have spent
signicantly more hours in care on average than comparable children prior to 2000 (4.83
hours). The large negative e¤ects in the later years for children of less educated mothers
suggests that they did not benet from low-fee daycare. These children were treated since
29Estimates using the PPVT raw score while controlling for age at the time of test lead to comparable
conclusions and can be obtained from the authors on request.
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birth, and most likely included a larger number of more vulnerable children, those that
low-fee daycare was supposed to help the most. Looking at the 5-year-olds of school age
(columns 9 to 12), we nd sizable negative and signicant e¤ects, from -2.9 in 2000 to -5.3 in
2008 (p<.01 or <.05). This is a large and increasing e¤ect (almost one third of a standard
deviation of the dependent variable). As a comparison, the ceteris paribus "e¤ect" of having
a mother with a post-secondary diploma or degree, as opposed to a high school diploma is
approximately 3.4.30 The e¤ects on cumulative hours of care for this group is also increasing
over time (column 3, Table A.4). The e¤ects are smaller in magnitude compared to those of
age 5 children not yet age-eligible for kindergarten, because the number of hours of care for
children in school decreased following the introduction of full-day kindergarten (see Table 4).
Again, the results are robust using Ontario as a control group instead of the RofC (columns
8 and 12).
When we separate the samples by the level of education of the childs mother, we nd
comparable, but somewhat less signicant estimates. Interestingly, the di¤erence by moth-
erseducation is somewhat less striking for children of kindergarten age. This suggests that
schools are able to reduce the knowledge gap observed prior to school entry. Looking at the
Québec coe¢ cient, we further see that schools are successful in Québec as the coe¢ cient
becomes largely signicant for age 5 children of kindergarten age, and is generally not sig-
nicant for children not yet in kindergarten (aged 4 and 5). This suggests that the school
setting is more successful in addressing the cognitive development of children. Schools and
daycare di¤er in a number of ways. While the number of children per educator is higher in
kindergarten (15 to 20 versus 6 to 10 depending on the age group in childcare), the quali-
cations of educators in school are also much higher. School educators are required to have
a 4-year university degree, while the requirements for a daycare provider are considerably
lower. This suggests that the qualication of educators may be crucial to the provision of a
high quality service able to serve the children most in need. This corroborates much of the
recent literature in economics on the importance of teacher quality.
In sum, the results are not signicant for children aged 4 and negative and signicant for
children aged 5. Since one of the objectives of the policy was to increase early literacy skills
and better prepare children for school, our results suggest that on this front the policy may
not have been successful. Our ndings suggest that a better way to address the needs of
children likely lies in the di¤erences between the Québec school setting and daycare settings.
Increased qualication of educators might be one solution, or junior kindergarten available
to all 4 year-olds, with smaller groups for the disadvantaged.
WAI and NK results Although the WAI and the NK were only administered as of 2000
(wave 4), after the start of the childcare reform, these test scores allow us to see whether
the increased number of spaces over the years relative to the 2000 level is paralleled with
30The estimated coe¢ cients on control variables are not presented here, but can be obtained on demand.
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changes in test scores over the same period.
The NLSCYs master les contain two measures for each test score. For the WAI scores,
Statistics Canada provides a raw score (values between 10 and 40) and a standardized scale
score (values 0 to 174), and for the NK, a level (0, 1, 2) representing the age equivalent for
the child interpreted as a direct measure, and an age standardized 30-point raw score (values
between 50 and 165). In both cases we use the standardized score. The take-up rate of the
WAI test is lower than for the PPVT: 76% for our sample compared to 90% for the PPVT.
The response rate to the NK is comparable to that of the PPVT at 90-91% in all waves.
The top panel of Table 8 provides the estimated coe¢ cients for the WAI. Estimates are
generally not signicant for the 4-year-olds. For age 5 children not of school age, the trend
appears to be negative, and especially so for children of less educated mothers. For age 5
children of kindergarten age, the trend is largely not signicant. We notice that the Quebec
dummy is negative and signicant for aged 4 and 5 children not age-eligible for kindergarten,
while it is closer to zero and not signicant for aged 5 children of school age. The negative
Québec coe¢ cient on pre-school children is even larger when we use Ontario instead of the
RofC, but of similar magnitude and also not signicant for children in school. This suggests
that (1) the Ontario 4-year-old kindergarten helps children better perform on cognitive test
scores, and (2) the Québec 5-year-old kindergarten helps Québec children close the gap on
cognitive test scores. This suggests that the school setting is particularly e¤ective in teaching
children cognitive abilities.
The bottom panel of Table 8 shows the estimated coe¢ cients for the NK. For the 4-year-
olds, we nd large positive trends, which are even larger for children of less educated mothers.
The skills measured by the NK rely on a small number of words related to numbers. These
appear to be well covered by daycare providers, but the early advantage quickly disappears.
Indeed, these e¤ects are no longer observed at age 5, whether in school or not, using both
comparison groups (RofC and Ontario). Again we nd that the Quebec dummy is large and
negative for pre-school children and small and not signicant for in school children.
Discussion In summary, the results by motherslevel of education suggest that the policy
did not reduce "social" gaps in school readiness. In fact, the negative estimated impacts of
the policy are generally larger for children whose mother is less educated. We provide three
explanations to help reconcile our results with former studies on the impact of ECEC on
preschool cognitive development. First, most studies evaluating the impact of daycare are
plagued by endogeneity or spurious correlation problems which is not the case in our study.
Second, rarely can we observe variations in hours of non-parental care for young children
of the magnitude observed after the implementation of the program. Services are available
10 to 12 hours (depending on the setting) per day, 261 days a year and at the same low-fee
per day for all children. For example, using the NLSCY, we observe that in 1994, 45% of all
children aged 1 to 4 were in childcare and 68% for more than 21 hours per week (excluding
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children with 0 hours); in 2002, 70% of children aged 1 to 4 were in childcare and 78% for
more than 21 hours; in 2008, 78% were in childcare and 83% for more than 21 hours per
week. Not only are more children in daycare but they are there for much longer hours. The
increase in the number of hours certainly reects the increased labour force participation
of mothers, but it may also be attributed to the structure of the program and its nancial
incentives31. The government asks daycare providers to ensure parents use daycare services
every day of the week (unless the child is sick or on vacation with his family): if a space is
not occupied full-time the subsidy may be reduced. In theory, a provider may o¤er part-time
spaces, but in practice they almost exclusively o¤er full-time full-week spaces because it is
easier to manage.
Third, although more children are now in regulated types of daycare, which is supposed
to be helpful or at a minimum not harmful, two major studies on the rst years of the
program (ISQ, 2004; Japel et al., 2005) show that the average quality in Québecs subsidized
daycare network is at best satisfactory and in many cases low or not acceptable, particularly
for children in lower-income families. Part of this is explained by the rush to implement the
program, build up new settings and create new spaces to respond to the excess demand for
spaces, which forced the government to accept daycare workers with no specic training in
ECEC. The Ministry of the Family imposes an "o¢ cial" ECEC program (embedded in the
childcare law) that childcare providers must follow. However, according to a recent audit
on educational childcare services conducted by the O¢ ce of the Auditor General of Québec
(VGQ, 2011), it is di¢ cult to determine if the program is implemented in specic daycare
settings and no action to enforce the program or measures to train the educators have been
observed across the province. The audit also nds that the percentage of subsidized centres
not respecting the maximum ratio of number of children per qualied educator was 42% in
2008-2009 and 54% in 2009-2010.
Therefore, the negative e¤ects we uncovered may not relate to childcare per se, but to
the structure of the program which creates strong incentives for families to use long hours
of care starting at a very young age and o¤ers at best average quality. A number of policies
possibly inuencing child development were mentioned in Section 2. Reforms common to
both Québec and the RofC are accounted for through our control group. However, the
Québec 2005 earned income supplement remains unaccounted for. It benets families by
raising their disposable income. This likely has positive impacts on child development, or at
worse no impact. This implies that the negative e¤ects we have uncovered with respect to
the daycare reform are most likely underestimated for 2006 and 2008.
31In fact, the $7 day fee translates to $3.5 (approximately 3 euros at the actual 2013 exchange rate) after
taking into account the federal income taxes (childcare fees are deductable expenses), family transfers based
on net taxable income, and a universal subsidy of $100 per month for each child aged 0 to 5 to help families
pay for childcare.
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10 Conclusion
In this paper we analyse the long-term/enduring e¤ects of the Québec daycare reform and
provide a comprehensive review of the costs and benets of the program. We showed that the
reform had important and lasting e¤ects on the number of hours children spend in daycare
from age 1 to 4. Not only the number of children attending daycare increased, but also the
number of hours they spend in daycare conditional on attending daycare.
The NLSCY compared to the SLID provided su¢ cient data to estimate the e¤ects of
the policy by sub-group. We found that the increased labour force participation and weeks
worked of mothers was also long lasting and mainly driven by highly educated mothers, in
particular for single mothers, the e¤ects of the program for single-mothers are estimated
to be very high, 25 to 40 percentage points and 13 to 16 weeks, but with a large standard
deviation. The e¤ects are also positive for mothers with a high school diploma or less but
much smaller (around 11 percentage points and up to 8 weeks).
We also found that the policy had no e¤ect on the labour supply of mothers with a very
young child (less than 6 months), and positive e¤ects for mothers with a child 6 to 12 months
before the introduction of the more generous parental leave, after which e¤ects estimated are
not signicant. This is in line with the changes in parental leave benets over the period.
We do nd evidence that the Québec parental leave policy induces fathers to take a 5 week
paid leave during the rst ve months after birth, in line with the availability of this leave
in the new policy.
Interestingly, for children aged 5 we uncovered strong evidence that implementing full-
day kindergarten alone was not enough to increase maternal labour force participation and
weeks worked, but when combined with the low-fee daycare program it was. Indeed, mothers
whose child was eligible to low-fee daycare early on were more likely to participate in the
labour market once their child reached age 5 compared to mothers whose child was not. The
policy did not impact the labour force participation of fathers, and had minor impacts on
their number of weeks worked.
We did not nd evidence that the evolution of family income changed in Québec after
the policy relative to the RofC, while mothersearnings increased more rapidly in Québec
compared to the RofC, the earnings of fathers in the RofC increased faster than in Québec,
probably because of a high level of economic activity in the western part of the country
sustained by the demand for natural resources, in particular in the rst decade of the mil-
lennium.
Finally, but certainly not least importantly, we found negative impacts on the cognitive
development of age 5 children. These e¤ects are also present for age 4 children, but not
signicant. Clearly, the daycare reform did not raise the average cognitive ability of children.
Again, we emphasize that we are estimating the e¤ects of a complex daycare policy, which
increased the number of hours of care and o¤ered at best average quality care, as opposed
to the e¤ect of childcare per se. Estimates for children aged 5 in school settings suggests
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that schools successfully raise the achievement of children in Québec and reduced the ability
gap observed prior to school entry between children of less educated mothers and highly
educated mothers. This nding suggests that the school setting is more successful in raising
childrens cognitive ability than the daycare setting. Therefore, raising the qualication of
childcare educators or a junior kindergarten program for 4 year-olds could be helpful for the
cognitive development of such children.
Since the policy aimed to increase the labour force participation of mothers and help chil-
dren be better prepared for school, we conclude that the policy was only partially successful.
These partial e¤ects generated both private and social benets, mainly to mothers (such
as nancial independance, more work experience, extended social network, empowerment).
But they also came at a fairly high cost to the government.
We showed that the provincial costs were most likely a lot larger than the scal benets,
at about 1.2 billion dollars versus 60 million to, at best, 500 million in 2004. This policy
turned out to be advantageous at the federal level as it increased the scal revenues of the
government by about 90 to 670 million, and reduced the scal credits related to daycare
expenses. Relative to the provinces GDP (in current Canadian dollars), the total costs
increased from 0.16 percentage points in 1996 to 0.63 percentage points in 2009. Thus the
policys costs, in terms of GDP, have quadrupled in ten years. Both the increasing number
of individuals employed in the subsidized network (29,228 jobs in 2001 to 62,233 in 2010,
mostly educators with 95% of all jobs occupied by women) and the rise in salaries paid to
these employees largely explain this trend. Since the government wants to fund more new
spaces, it will need to attract more employees to the sector. We therefore expect wages
and total costs to further increase. Any major e¤ort of this kind in other provinces or
countries should be done much more slowly, the labour supply e¤ects will be smaller, but
the likelihood of an increase in cognitive development will increase if well-trained personnel
and lower child/educator ratio are the norm.
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12 Figures
Figure 1: Number of regulated spaces
Note: Shows the evolution of the number of spaces by mode of care between 1994 and 2012. As of 2001, all spaces are in
centre, not-for-prot, and family-based care. Most spaces in centre for-prot care are at the subsidized low fee. The number of
spaces is measured on March 31st of each year by the Direction générale des services de garde, Ministry of Families and Elders
(MFA). The vertical line marks the rst post-reform year. The data can be accessed at www.mfa.gouv.qc.ca/fr/services-de-
garde/portrait/places/Pages/index.aspx.
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Figure 2: Total public subsidies and subsidy
per space
Note: The solid line shows the evolution of the total annual public subisdies allocated to the ECEC program in millions of
dollars (left axis). The solid-dotted line shows the annual subsidy per space in dollars (right axis). The subsidy per space is the
mean subsidy for both providers and families before 2000 and low-fee spaces since 2000. Our sources of data are the Ministry
of Families and Elders (number of spaces) and the Treasury Board (total subsidies).
Figure 3: Primary care arrangement of
children aged 1 to 4 by year in percentages
Note: Shows the evolution of the percentage of the primary modes of care in the Rest of Canada (left panel) and Québec (right
panel) by wave. The sample includes NLSCY cross-sectional children aged 1 to 4.
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Figure 4: Mean hours per week spent in the
primary care arrangement for children
aged 1 to 4
Note: Shows the evolution of the mean number of hours per week spent in the primary mode of care in the Rest of Canada
(left panel) and Québec (right panel) non conditionally (hollow square) and conditionally on attending childcare (hollow circle).
The sample includes NLSCY cross-sectional children aged 1 to 4.
Figure 5: Labour force participation of
mothers (two-parent and single-parent
families) and fathers by region
Note: Shows the evolution of parental labour force participation for the NLSCY cross-sectional children aged 1 to 4.
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Figure 6: Family total income by family type
and region
Note: Shows the evolution of mean total household income in the reference year from all sources before taxes by family type,
for NLSCY cross-sectional children aged 1 to 4.
Figure 7: Percentage of families receiving welfare
transfers by family type and region
Note: Displays the percentage of NLSCY cross-sectional children aged 1 to 4 whose parents receive welfare benets in the
reference year.
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Figure 8: Percentage of families below LICOs by
family type and region
Note: Displays the percentage of families below StatisticsCanada Low-Income Cut-O¤s (LICOs) for the NLSCY cross-sectional
children aged 1 to 4.
Figure 9: Simulated changes in familiescredits,
transfers and income taxes by level of
governement for year 2004
Note: Shows the simulated changes in provincial (Québec) and federal (Canada) income taxes (left axis) and credits and
transfers (right axis) from a 10 percentage point increase in the labour market participation of mothers. The simulation uses
SLID data for mothers with at least one child aged 1 to 11. Simulation number 1 assumes that the lowest earners join the
labour market, while simulation number 85 assumes that the highest earners join the labour market (corresponding to 10 percent
increase in labour force participation of mothers with at least on child aged 1 to 11) . From simulation 1 to 85, the 10% window
moves from the bottom of the income distribution to the top by 5 observations at each simulation.
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12.1 Tables
Table 1: Mean Characteristics of all mothers and families with at
least one child aged 0-5 by region and wave
Year 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Québec
Child is a girl 51.6 51.0 51.3 51.5 51.3 52.1 51.5 51.8
Mother
Less than high school 18.7 15.8 15.4 15.4 14.5 16.8 9.8 8.1
High school diploma 15.8 15.3 12.7 16.8 17.3 15.0 11.3 12.0
Some post-secondary 25.3 24.0 25.0 20.0 20.8 12.1 14.5 11.3
Post-secondary degree 40.2 45.0 47.0 47.7 47.4 56.1 64.4 68.6
Age 14-24 at birth 20.7 20.9 22.2 26.2 24.6 22.5 17.4 15.6
Age 25-29 at birth 40.4 36.7 34.2 34.2 34.6 37.2 37.9 37.3
Age 30-34 at birth 29.2 31.6 32.0 27.5 27.3 27.2 31.0 33.5
Age 35 or more at birth 9.8 10.8 11.6 12.1 13.5 13.2 13.7 13.6
Born in Canada 90.6 91.5 88.8 88.4 85.9 82.8 82.0 81.1
Family
Single-parent 12.3 13.3 13.9 14.0 10.7 12.7 10.9 10.4
Two-parent 87.7 86.7 86.1 86.0 89.3 87.3 89.1 89.6
Older siblings 50.5 53.7 55.7 54.4 53.8 53.2 52.5 52.1
Younger siblings 26.0 23.2 21.3 23.1 23.9 21.6 21.0 25.1
Presence of other children 2.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 1.5 1.4 1.9 2.6
Size of area of residence >499K 55.2 59.8 59.9 59.5 55.3 56.6 63.2 62.0
Size of area of residence 100-499K 11.6 6.2 6.0 6.2 5.9 5.1 6.9 7.0
Size of area of residence 30-99.999K 8.3 9.2 10.1 8.8 8.3 7.2 10.4 9.6
Size of area of residence < 30K 7.9 10.9 10.5 10.0 17.0 17.9 6.4 7.2
Size of area of residence: rural 17.0 14.0 13.5 15.5 13.6 13.2 13.1 14.1
Household income ($2002) 51,744 51,491 56,710 61,858 63,998 60,278 65,424 70,978
N 2,236 2,045 4,013 2,766 2,143 1,522 1,520 1,727
Rest of Canada
Child is a girl 51.1 51.5 51.4 51.2 51.2 51.2 51.2 51.0
Mother
Less than high school 14.7 11.6 11.4 12.5 10.3 9.7 8.8 9.1
High school diploma 18.1 18.1 17.1 18.4 21.8 20.8 18.2 17.5
Some post-secondary 28.5 28.8 26.8 21.9 13.7 12.7 12.7 13.7
Post-secondary degree 38.7 41.5 44.7 47.1 54.3 56.9 60.3 59.6
14-24 years at birth 19.3 18.3 17.9 21.2 18.8 19.3 18.7 18.6
25-29 years at birth 35.8 34.5 32.0 31.9 31.7 28.9 28.8 29.2
30-34 years at birth 31.3 32.8 33.8 31.8 32.8 33.2 33.7 32.9
35 years or more at birth 13.6 14.4 16.3 15.2 16.7 18.7 18.8 19.3
Born in Canada 79.7 78.8 80.0 78.1 74.9 74.5 72.1 73.4
Family
Single-parent 15.0 13.9 13.7 13.5 12.1 12.2 13.2 13.2
Two-parent 85.0 86.1 86.3 86.5 87.9 87.8 86.8 86.8
Older siblings 57.3 57.3 57.9 56.4 56.7 55.9 55.4 55.6
Younger siblings 24.8 25.2 24.2 24.6 23.0 22.4 22.4 23.0
Presence of other children 1.8 2.0 2.7 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.9
Size of area of residence >499K 41.9 43.2 44.8 46.8 42.7 41.5 48.9 48.2
Size of area of residence 100-499K 20.7 22.2 21.6 21.3 14.9 14.7 21.2 21.3
Size of area of residence 30-99.999K 7.6 8.3 8.8 8.7 8.9 8.8 9.3 9.6
Size of area of residence < 30K 12.8 14.4 13.3 13.1 23.4 24.6 9.3 9.2
Size of area of residence: rural 17.0 11.9 11.5 10.2 10.1 10.4 11.2 11.7
Household income ($2002) 58,036 56,747 63,978 70,622 72,130 68,645 72,969 77,243
N 9,721 8,589 15,950 13,870 10,465 8,528 9,657 10,429
Note: Shows the weighted summary statistics for children aged 0 to 5 by year. All statistics are percentages
except household income.
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Table 2: Parental work-childcare profile and mode of care used by
quartile of gross family total income
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 All
Family total income quartile cut-o¤ point $47,400 $71,200 $102,220 - na
Mean income of quartile $29,744 $59,101 $84,943 $140,208 $78,447
Parental work-childcare usage prole
Parent(s) work/study and use childcare 51 67 73 84 69
Parent(s) work/study and no childcare 14 12 16 8 12
Parent(s) do not work/study 36 21 11 8 19
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Mode of care used
Family-based (other home) 8 11 13 8 10
Family-based (other, relative) 5 3 5 2 4
Childs home (by a non relative/relative) 7 6 3 8 6
Daycare centre 31 45 52 65 47
Does not use childcare (not working/studying) 45 31 25 14 30
Not asked 4 4 2 3 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Number of children un-weighted 372 400 401 315 1,482
Weighted observations 101,763 101,312 101,466 101,299 405,840
Note: The statistics presented in this table were computed using the 2008-09 NLSCY data on cross-sectional children
aged 0 to 59 months in Québec. The mode of care used is only asked to parents using childcare for work or study. As
such, we pooled children of parents who do not work or study under the label "Not asked".
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Table 3: Estimated effects of the policy on weekly hours spent in
the primary mode of care: children aged 1 to 4
Hours of care Conditional hours of care (intensity)
Type of family two single all all two single all all
parents parent family family# parents parent family family#
3 (1998-99) 1.86** 3.52 2.05** 2.06** 1.79* 2.96 1.84** 1.88*
(0.84) (2.47) (0.81) (0.80) (1.01) (2.52) (0.94) (0.94)
4 (2000-01) 5.99*** 4.59* 5.72*** 5.74*** 3.17* 0.45 2.74*** 2.78***
(0.85) (2.54) (0.79) (0.79) (0.88) (2.76) (0.86) (0.86)
5 (2002-03) 7.90*** 10.78*** 8.29*** 8.30*** 3.41*** 3.98* 3.42*** 3.45***
(0.90) (2.55) (0.85) (0.85) (0.93) (2.35) (0.86) (0.86)
6 (2004-05) 9.93*** 10.98*** 10.01*** 10.02*** 5.47*** 3.15 5.05*** 5.09***
(0.99) (3.01) (0.96) (0.96) (0.98) (2.66) (0.90) (0.90)
7 (2006-07) 10.79*** 12.57*** 11.05*** 11.08*** 4.12*** 1.77 3.74*** 3.78***
(0.89) (2.52) (0.85) (0.85) (0.90) (2.53) (0.83) (0.83)
8 (2008-09) 10.36*** 14.20*** 10.82*** 10.85*** 3.53*** 2.07 3.33*** 3.37***
(0.93) (2.63) (0.87) (0.87) (0.95) (2.73) (0.95) (0.86)
N 56,576 8,672 65,248 16 29,635 4,876 34,511 16
Mothers labour force participation Mothers weeks worked
two single all all two single all all
parents parent family family# parents parent family family#
3 (1998-99) 0.05** 0.12* 0.06** 0.06*** 0.96 2.73 1.14 1.26
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (1.11) (2.94) (1.03) (1.03)
4 (2000-01) 0.11*** 0.11* 0.11*** 0.11*** 4.17*** 3.69 3.99*** 4.07***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (1.13) (3.13) (1.07) (1.07)
5 (2002-03) 0.08*** 0.12* 0.09*** 0.09*** 4.19*** 4.25 4.15*** 4.21***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (1.12) (3.19) (1.04) (1.04)
6 (2004-05) 0.14*** 0.06 0.13*** 0.14*** 5.54*** 1.27 5.01*** 5.07***
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (1.21) (3.54) (1.15) (1.15)
7 (2006-07) 0.11*** 0.13* 0.11*** 0.11*** 3.61*** 5.00 3.72*** 3.75***
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (1.28) (3.61) (1.22) (1.22)
8 (2008-09) 0.14*** 0.09 0.13*** 0.13*** 5.88*** 3.96 5.61*** 5.62***
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (1.26) (3.47) (1.18) (1.18)
N 57,267 8,613 65,880 16 57,211 8,595 65,806 16
Note: We use the sample of all children aged 1 to 4. The dependent variables are the number of hours in care (columns 1 to 4), a
dummy for labour force participation at the time of the interview (columns 5 to 8) and the number of weeks worked in the reference
year (columns 9 to 12). All specications control for the sex of the child, the age of the child in years, the age group of the mother
at child birth (25-29, 30-34, 35 or more with 14-24 the omitted group), the family type (step-family, single-parent, with two-parent
the omitted group), a dummy for whether the mother was born in Canada or not, the mothers highest level of education (less
than a high school diploma, high school diploma, some postsecondary education, with post-secondary diploma, the omitted group),
the presence and number of older or younger siblings or the presence of a child of the same age, the size of the community (ve
groups from rural to 500,000 or more the omitted group). Except for columns labeled "all family#", our evaluation strategy relies
on equation (1). Estimates denoted with the supercript "#" are obtained using a two-step procedure to account for unobserved
aggregate transitory shocks. Standard errors are in parentheses and all are bootstrapped to account for the sampling design of the
NLSCY. Statistical signicance is denoted using asterisks: *** is p<0.01, ** is p<0.05, and * is p<0.1.
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Table 4: Estimated effects of the policy on weekly hours spent in
the primary mode of care by age of the child
Age of children 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 5
6 5 mths > 6 mths not eligible eligible
for K-5 for K-5
Hours of care
3 (1998-99) 2.06 3.30* 1.66 2.89* 0.94 2.65 2.26 -5.34***
(1.28) (1.74) (1.11) (1.72) (1.53) (1.73) (2.25) (1.15)
4 (2000-01) 0.73 6.38*** 4.03*** 8.20*** 5.21*** 5.81*** 6.25** -3.66***
(1.29) (1.79) (1.39) (1.43) (1.34) (1.88) (2.61) (1.31)
5 (2002-03) 0.06 7.39*** 7.81*** 9.50*** 7.26*** 8.24*** 11.16*** -4.02***
(0.88) (2.10) (1.70) (1.76) (1.64) (1.59) (2.37) (1.22)
6 (2004-05) -1.11* -1.33 9.97*** 11.17*** 8.69*** 10.20*** 6.05* -4.73***
(0.63) (1.79) (1.61) (1.85) (1.86) (2.17) (3.57) (1.31)
7 (2006-07) -0.89 0.24 7.99*** 10.06*** 11.92*** 14.05*** 16.72*** -4.29***
(0.61) (1.82) (1.57) (1.72) (1.54) (1.81) (3.62) (1.33)
8 (2008-09) -0.70 3.06 7.25*** 9.74*** 12.62*** 14.33*** 16.20*** -4.42***
(0.76) (1.99) (1.44) (1.93) (1.58) (1.77) (2.97) (1.33)
N 2,963 11,668 19,363 13,978 18,105 13,802 6,594 16,424
Conditional hours of care (intensity)
3 (1998-99) - - -0.92 0.25 2.19 6.95*** 2.99 -8.79***
(1.23) (2.00) (1.72) (1.85) (3.13) (1.48)
4 (2000-01) - - 1.46 2.71 3.70*** 4.29** 2.45 -8.82***
(1.36) (1.67) (1.39) (1.93) (3.69) (1.63)
5 (2002-03) - - 1.27 3.79** 4.08** 4.88*** 6.73** -9.67***
(1.62) (1.65) (1.62) (1.72) (3.20) (1.54)
6 (2004-05) - - 2.69* 6.03*** 4.08** 8.29*** 12.72*** -10.28***
(1.38) (1.72) (1.76) (1.94) (3.72) (1.57)
7 (2006-07) - - 0.89 1.76 4.08** 8.63*** 8.93** -11.72***
(1.44) (1.71) (1.52) (1.70) (3.68) (1.70)
8 (2008-09) - - 0.25 1.91 4.72*** 7.02*** 1.82*** -11.12***
(1.50) (1.82) (1.57) (1.93) (3.47) (1.65)
Observations - - 9,605 7,398 10,065 7,443 3,252 8,005
Note: The dependent variables are the number of hours in care including zero hours of care (top panel) and excluding
zero hours of care (bottom panel). The age of children included in the sample is specied at the top of each column, with
children aged 5 divided in two groups: (1) not age eligible to kindergarten (K-5) and (2) age eligible to
K-5. Children from all family types are included. We include the same controls as in Table 3. Standard errors are in
parentheses and all are bootstrapped to account for the sampling design of the NLSCY. Statistical signicance is denoted
using asterisks: *** is p<0.01, ** is p<0.05, and * is p<0.1.
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Table 5: Estimated effects of the policy on motherslabour force
participation and weeks worked by age of the children
Age of children 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 5
6 5 mths > 6 mths not eligible eligible
for K-5 for K-5
Mothers current labour force participation
3 (1998-99) 0.00 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.11** 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04
(0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
4 (2000-01) 0.08 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.03 0.13** -0.06 0.00
(0.10) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
5 (2002-03) -0.29** 0.11** 0.12*** 0.10** 0.03 0.08* 0.07 0.00
(0.11) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05)
6 (2004-05) 0.07 0.09 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.12** -0.07 0.11*
(0.15) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06)
7 (2006-07) 0.22* 0.00 0.13*** 0.12** 0.12*** 0.07 0.17* 0.09
(0.12) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06)
8 (2008-09) 0.16 0.04 0.07* 0.20*** 0.09** 0.17*** 0.01 0.09*
(0.17) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05)
N 2,980 11,797 19,650 14,114 18,210 13,906 6,668 16,608
Mothers weeks worked in reference year
3 (1998-99) -1.95 3.02 3.97*** 2.54 1.37 -2.79 -1.26 -2.73
(3.25) (2.12) (1.47) (2.37) (1.95) (2.00) (3.34) (2.11)
4 (2000-01) 3.13 4.73** 6.64*** 4.00** 1.20 4.29* -3.58 -0.43
(4.20) (2.40) (1.83) (1.88) (1.76) (2.39) (3.57) (2.43)
5 (2002-03) -4.82 7.01*** 7.67*** 2.77 2.05 4.13** 3.36 -1.68
(5.49) (2.61) (2.08) (2.10) (2.19) (1.99) (3.54) (2.37)
6 (2004-05) 3.98 2.80 5.38*** 4.96** 4.79** 5.27** -0.29 4.45*
(8.02) (2.32) (1.97) (2.18) (2.21) (2.36) (4.48) (2.66)
7 (2006-07) 8.56 -0.72 2.63 4.74* 4.95** 2.80 6.11 3.09
(7.13) (2.50) (2.04) (2.71) (2.02) (2.41) (4.89) (2.72)
8 (2008-09) 5.95 0.55 3.14 7.17*** 5.40*** 7.46*** 4.67 2.20
(8.32) (2.08) (1.96) (2.51) (1.94) (2.33) (4.03) (2.73)
Observations 2,972 11,758 19,585 14,101 18,202 13,918 6,673 16,589
Note: The dependent variables are a dummy for maternal labour force participation (top panel) and the number of weeks
worked by the mother in the reference year (bottom panel). Children from all family types are included. We include the same
controls as in Table 3. Standard errors are in parentheses and all are bootstrapped to account for the sampling design of the
NLSCY. Statistical signicance is denoted using asterisks: *** is p<0.01, ** is p<0.05, and * is p<0.1.
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Table 6: Estimated effects of the policy on fathers
labour force participation and weeks worked by age
of the children
Age of children 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 5
6 5 mths > 6 mths not eligible eligible
for K-5 for K-5
Fathers current labour force participation
3 (1998-99) 0.07* -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.07* -0.04*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
4 (2000-01) 0.11*** 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
5 (2002-03) -0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
6 (2004-05) 0.00 -0.01 0.06** 0.04 0.05** -0.03 -0.06 -0.01
(0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
7 (2006-07) 0.08 0.08** 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.11 -0.01
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03)
8 (2008-09) -0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.02
(0.18) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
N 2,627 10,315 16,984 12,108 15,518 11,760 5,623 13,855
Fathers weeks worked in reference year
3 (1998-99) 2.62 -0.30 0.09 -1.07 -1.93 0.34 -1.95 -2.83**
(2.35) (1.95) (1.24) (1.50) (1.31) (1.24) (1.74) (1.23)
4 (2000-01) -0.10 2.37 2.36* -0.43 0.54 0.50 -1.56 -0.27
(3.21) (1.65) (1.24) (1.31) (1.24) (1.45) (2.11) (1.38)
5 (2002-03) 2.03 1.95 1.32 -0.38 0.65 0.46 -0.51 -1.35
(3.35) (1.79) (1.46) (1.46) (1.28) (1.31) (2.05) (1.58)
6 (2004-05) 3.23 0.06 1.45 -1.26 2.44** -3.21* -2.75 -0.29
(3.64) (1.81) (1.22) (1.45) (1.10) (1.87) (3.10) (1.70)
7 (2006-07) 4.91* 2.02 -0.38 -3.45* 0.51 -0.19 -4.76 -1.57
(2.80) (1.66) (1.35) (2.01) (1.22) (1.51) (5.01) (1.91)
8 (2008-09) -6.38 -0.82 0.06 0.61 -0.61 0.30 -4.12 -1.08
(8.61) (1.71) (1.32) (1.45) (1.34) (1.41) (2.87) (1.58)
N 2,620 10,279 16,916 12,084 15,495 11,759 5,618 13,889
Note: The dependent variables are a dummy for paternal labour force participation (top panel) and the number
of weeks worked by the father in the reference year (bottom panel). Children from all family types are included.
We include the same controls as in Table 3. Again the superscript "#" denotes the two-steps procedure. Standard
errors are in parentheses and all are bootstrapped to account for the sampling design of the NLSCY. Statistical
signicance is denoted using asterisks: *** is p<0.01, ** is p<0.05, and * is p<0.1.
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Web Appendix to
Canadian Evidence on Ten Years of Universal
Preschool Policies: The Good and the Bad
Catherine Haeck, Pierre Lefebvre and Philip Merrigan
June 2013
In this Web Appendix we present additional information on the evolution of the childcare
network and the net cost to families, the literature on ECEC and child development and
the cognitive tests score used. Additional gures and tables are also presented to further
support our papers discussion.
1 Evolution of the childcare network and net costs to
families
Figure A. 1: Number of regulated spaces
This gure corresponds to Figure 1 in the paper. Not only does it show the evolution
in the total number of spaces, but it also shows that as of 2000, not-for-prot centres and
family daycare services o¤ered exclusively low-fee spaces and continued to do so over the
entire observation period. For-prot centres provide a fairly stable number of spaces over
the period, except in recent years when it has increased. These centres regroup those that are
subsidized by the government (and o¤er low-fee spaces) and those that are fully private but
regulated. Prior to 2001, these two categories cannot be distinguished with publicly available
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data. As of 2001, most of these centres were subsidized by the government and o¤ered low-
fee spaces (97%). While the number of low-fee spaces in for-prot centres remained stable
from 2001 onwards, the number of fully private regulated spaces increased.
Even if the number of spaces has been steadily increasing, the perception has always
been that the demand for low-fee spaces was above the number of available spaces because
of long waiting lists. Unregulated spaces eligible for a scal treatment (a deduction at the
federal level and a refundable tax credit at the prvincial level) o¤er an alternative solution to
regulated spaces. To ease o¤ the pressure on the demand for low-fee spaces and to reduce the
net-cost di¤erence between private childcare and low-fee childcare, the scale of the refundable
tax credit for those not using low-fee daycare was increased twice (2008 and 2009). Since
2009, the maximum annual expense eligible for a tax credit is $9,000 per child less than 7
years of age. The minimum credit rate is 44% (compared to 26% earlier) and the maximum
remained unchanged at 75%. The minimum rate is applied to a family whose household
income is $125,000 or over (compared to 84,040$ earlier). In 2004, the daily price of $5 was
increased to $7.
Accounting for federal tax credits and family transfers, the net cost for a subsidized space
for a child under age 5 is in fact $2.87 per day for a family income up to $150,000. Assuming
a chilcare cost of $25 per day per child for 260 days ($6,500), the enhanced refundable tax
credit reduces the net cost to $3.31 per day for families with less than $125,000 of income.
This partially explains the recent increase in the number of spaces in for-prot centres (see
Figure 1).
2 Complement to ECEC and child development liter-
ature
In this section we expand some of the content presented in the paper while keeping the
same structure (and in some cases we repeat some of the content of the paper). Again,
for a more detailed overview of the literature we refer the reader to Almond and Currie
(2011). We rstrst briey review research on children aged 0 to 2, then on children aged 3
to 5. Then, we discuss evidence on the impact of the quality and intensity of care, and the
optimal entry age in daycare. We provide additional details on research on part-time versus
full-time kindergarten. Finally, we provide further details on the measures used by Baker et
al. (2008).
First, on children aged 0 to 2, there is a growing body of empirical results indicating
that maternal employment and time spent in childcare during the rst year of life can have
adverse e¤ects on a childs developmental outcomes (such as verbal, reading and math scores,
and indices of behavioural problems) observed at later ages (Ruhm, 2004; Waldfogel et al.,
2002; Hill et al. 2005), even after controlling for childcare quality, the quality of the home
environment, and maternal sensitivity (Brooks-Gunn et al., 2002; Hill et al., 2002; and for
United Kingdom, Gregg et al. 2005).
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Second, for children aged 3 to 5, several studies on the e¤ect of preschool programs nd
signicant positive e¤ects on cognitive outcomes (letter-word identication, spelling and
applied problems) and measures of school readiness (Gormley and Gayer, 2005; Gormley
et al., 2005; Magnuson et al., 2007, 2004). For disadvantaged children (whether dened by
poverty status, low maternal education, single-parent headship, or mothers who do not speak
English) the cognitive gains are larger and longer lasting (e.g. Burger, 2010) A large-scale
UK study following children aged 2 or more attending centre-based preschool nds similar
results (Sammons et al., 2002, 2003).
Third, while the quality of care seems to have positive, but small, e¤ects on cognitive
outcomes (Blau, 1999; Duncan et al., 2003; Belsky et al. 2007), longer hours in all types of
preschool programs seem to be associated with increased behavioural problems that persist
over time (Magnuson et al., 2004, 2005). On the intensity of care, Loeb et al. (2007) nd
that for disadvantaged children (aged 2-3), 30 hours per week of care for at least 9 months
per year has little detrimental e¤ect on their behaviour, while producing positive e¤ects on
their cognitive outcomes. In contrast, the cognitive development of children from wealthier
households appears to benet from daycare outside the home only if it is part-time (between
15 to 30 hours per week for at least 9 months per year).
Fourth, the existing American studies on full-day versus half-day kindergarten suggest
that the impact of full-day kindergarten on academic and social outcomes is somewhat
mixed. Most studies fail to control for student assignment to kindergarten programs and
have fairly short observation periods. Using American longitudinal data providing extensive
information on the childs socioeconomic context and school32 Lee et al. (2006) nd that
full-day kindergarten children learn more in literacy and mathematics over the kindergarten
year than those in half-day programs. In contrast to previous studies, they do not nd
that full-day kindergarten is more e¤ective for low-income/at-risk children. Using data from
the same survey, DeCicca (2007) nds that full-day kindergarten has sizeable impacts on
academic achievement during the rst year of program implementation, but the estimated
gains are short-lived, particularly for minority children. However, the e¢ ciency of the full-day
kindergarten intervention may be contingent upon class size as students in smaller full-day
classes benet more (Zvoch et al, 2008).
Finally, in Canada, the Baker et al. (2008) study highlights some negative e¤ects of
the Québec daycare policy on both behavioural scores and health indicators of Québecs
children and parents. For the 0-2 year-olds parent-reported measures such as "never had
a nose/throat/ear infection" are used. These are benign health outcomes and this life ex-
perience may have reinforce their immunitary system and their long term health (Ball et
al. 2002; Lu et al. 2004; Côté et al. 2010). For children aged 2 to 3 the behaviour of
the child is measured using an emotional anxiety score, a physical aggression score, and a
32The Early Childhood Longitudinal Study Kindergarten cohort, a nationally representative sample of
over 8,000 kindergarteners.
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separation anxiety score, each based on a serie of parent-reported measures. Finally, for the
0-4 year-olds, the authors use the answer excellent to the question: "In general, would you
say this childs health is ... at time of survey". For parents, the mothers depression score
and the family dysfunction index are used.
3 Cognitive tests
In this section we provide further details on the cognitive tests available in the NLSCY and
used in this research.
For the PPVT, children are presented with a number of pictures arranged in a multiple-
choice format and asked to select the one that best illustrates the meaning of the word orally
presented by the examiner. Vocabulary is highly correlated with general intelligence and
represents knowledge closely aligned with the "cultural capital" of the childs environment.
It is not easy to shift vocabulary up as it depends on years of conversations between adults
and children and it also depends on adults reading to children.
The WAI test includes two sets of tasks. The copying scale measures the ability to
conceptualize and reproduce a given gure (e.g., a circle, cross, square, triangle and diamond
which the child attempts to copy), while the symbol scale focuses on the understanding of
the meaning of specic symbols (e.g., letters, numbers, words, and sentences). Children are
only required to complete as much as they feel they can, but they are encouraged to at least
attempt each task.
The NK test for this age group denes three levels of understanding: pre-dimensional
(levels 0), unidimensional (level 1), and bidimensional (level 2). Statistics Canada considers
that the assessment provides data users with information about the childs acquisition of the
necessary skills to succeed at math in school.
While the PPVT was administered in all waves of the NLSCY, the WAI and NK were
only administered as of wave 4 after the policy was implemented. However, given that the
policy had large e¤ects on hours in care in waves 5 to 8 relative to wave 4, we felt compelled
to estimate models for WAI and NK using wave 4 as the comparison year.
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4 Figure
Figure A. 2: Annual weeks worked by mothers
(in two-parent or single-parent households),
fathers and families by region
Note: Shows the evolution of parental weeks worked for NLSCY cross-
sectional children aged 1 to 4.
5 Tables
54
T
ab
le
A
.
1:
R
eg
u
la
t
ed
c
h
il
d
c
a
r
e
sp
a
c
es
b
y
pr
o
v
in
c
e
(e
st
im
at
es
)
in
20
01
a
n
d
20
06
N
um
b
er
of
N
um
b
er
of
P
ro
vi
nc
ia
l
M
ed
ia
n
N
et
in
co
m
e
N
um
b
er
of
re
gu
la
te
d
sp
ac
es
1
su
bs
id
iz
ed
su
bs
id
y
in
da
ily
fe
e4
th
re
sh
ol
d
ch
ild
re
n
sp
ac
es
2
m
ill
io
n
$3
in
fa
nt
-c
hi
ld
fo
r
su
bs
id
y5
ag
ed
0
to
5
P
ro
vi
nc
e/
Y
ea
r
20
01
20
06
20
06
20
06
20
06
20
06
20
05
N
ew
fo
un
dl
an
d
L
ab
ra
do
r
3,
63
2
5,
01
7
1,
45
9
12
,3
21
-4
5
37
,6
00
28
,9
00
P
ri
nc
e
E
dw
ar
d
Is
la
nd
3,
69
7
3,
39
4
84
3
4,
7
20
-3
0
51
,0
40
7,
90
0
N
ov
a
Sc
ot
ia
11
,3
14
13
,0
93
2,
80
4
23
,7
23
-2
7
34
,9
92
50
,9
00
N
ew
B
ru
ns
w
ic
k
5,
82
0
13
,1
63
3,
86
8
22
,5
22
-2
5
24
,1
80
43
,8
00
Q
ué
b
ec
13
2,
54
5
20
0,
00
5
19
6,
61
8
1,
49
3
7
N
/A
43
4,
80
0
O
nt
ar
io
11
8,
11
0
15
8,
72
7
10
9,
81
3
53
4,
1
25
-3
6
M
ul
ti
pl
e6
82
2,
00
0
M
an
it
ob
a
14
,1
30
19
,4
73
10
,8
30
86
,3
10
-2
5
40
,4
75
76
,9
00
Sa
sk
at
ch
ew
an
4,
10
6
7,
80
5
3,
67
2
22
,8
13
-1
8
54
,9
60
67
,1
00
A
lb
er
ta
41
,0
11
47
,5
87
11
,9
32
72
,5
18
-2
6
77
,4
00
22
8,
40
0
B
ri
ti
sh
C
ol
um
bi
a
36
,3
83
54
,0
07
10
,6
65
17
6,
1
25
-3
4
71
,0
16
23
3,
20
0
C
an
ad
a
37
0,
74
8
52
2,
37
1
35
2,
50
4
2,
44
8
-
-
1,
99
3,
90
0
1
.
C
en
te
r-
a
n
d
fa
m
il
y
-b
a
se
d
fu
ll
-a
n
d
p
a
rt
-d
a
y
ch
il
ca
re
fo
r
p
re
sc
h
o
o
l-
a
g
ed
ch
il
d
re
n
(0
-5
,
a
n
d
0
-4
in
Q
u
éb
ec
)
2
.
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
ch
il
d
re
n
in
re
g
u
la
te
d
ch
il
ca
re
re
ce
iv
in
g
su
b
si
d
ie
s
3
.
P
ro
v
in
ci
a
l
a
ll
o
ca
ti
o
n
(f
ee
su
b
si
d
y
+
o
n
e
ti
m
e
fu
n
d
in
g
+
re
cu
rr
in
g
fu
n
d
in
g
)
fo
r
re
g
u
la
te
d
ch
il
ca
re
in
2
0
0
5
-2
0
0
6
4
.
M
ed
ia
n
d
a
il
y
fe
e
(i
n
fa
n
t
-o
ld
er
ch
il
d
re
n
).
F
o
r
O
n
ta
ri
o
,
M
a
n
it
o
b
a
,
S
a
sk
a
tc
h
ew
a
n
,
A
lb
er
ta
a
n
d
B
C
w
e
d
iv
id
ed
th
e
m
o
n
th
ly
fe
es
b
y
2
2
.
5
.
B
re
a
k
-e
v
en
p
o
in
t
o
f
el
ig
ib
il
it
y
fo
r
fe
e
su
b
si
d
y
(n
et
in
co
m
e
2
0
0
5
/
0
6
),
2
p
a
re
n
ts
,
1
o
r
2
ch
il
d
re
n
6
.
T
h
e
su
b
si
d
y
in
O
n
ta
ri
o
d
ep
en
d
s
o
n
th
e
co
st
o
f
ch
il
d
ca
re
a
m
d
tj
e
n
et
in
co
m
e
o
f
th
e
fa
m
il
y.
S
o
u
rc
e:
F
ri
en
d
ly
et
a
l.
(2
0
0
9
)
55
Table A. 2: Estimated effects of the policy on weekly hours spent in
the primary mode of care by the mothers level of education
Age of children 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 5 1 to 4 1 to 4
6 5 mths > 6 mths not eligible eligible 2-parent 1-parent
for K-5 for K-5
High school or less
3 (1998-99) -1.27 2.79 0.17 6.38* -2.91 -4.30 -0.22 -5.86*** 0.32 0.30
(1.57) (2.58) (1.64) (3.40) (2.97) (2.68) (3.45) (1.92) (1.72) (3.02)
4 (2000-01) 2.36 3.37 2.81 4.23** 0.86 2.90 3.61 -4.26** 2.23 4.81
(5.25) (2.76) (2.33) (2.03) (2.39) (3.66) (4.14) (2.14) (1.66) (3.10)
5 (2002-03) -1.14 12.14*** 2.18 10.05*** 4.13 2.04 8.18** -5.08** 4.35*** 7.18**
(1.26) (4.37) (2.56) (2.94) (3.25) (2.60) (3.71) (1.99) (1.67) (3.30)
6 (2004-05) -2.79 9.15*** 12.69*** 5.35* 5.25 -1.75 -3.61* 7.62*** 8.62**
(2.21) (2.84) (2.75) (3.13) (3.79) (4.40) (2.18) (1.75) (4.25)
7 (2006-07) -2.03 6.73* 10.49*** 13.88*** 10.32*** 12.62*** 30.93*** -6.07*** 11.59*** 13.72***
(1.25) (3.48) (3.34) (3.91) (2.81) (3.86) (9.93) (2.15) (2.01) (3.41)
8 (2008-09) -1.06 5.03 8.98*** 10.00** 8.88*** 10.21** 13.90*** -4.05 7.87*** 12.32***
(1.22) (3.22) (2.59) (4.68) (3.11) (5.10) (5.15) (2.47) (2.16) (3.62)
N 920 3,496 5,915 4,302 5,687 4,184 2,117 4,992 15,929 4,159
Post-secondary degree
3 (1998-99) 4.47** 4.13 2.92 -0.14 2.85 4.10 2.68 -3.60* 1.94 10.59**
(2.24) (2.80) (1.90) (2.32) (2.34) (2.75) (4.25) (2.00) (1.25) (5.28)
4 (2000-01) 0.77 7.86*** 6.76*** 8.41*** 6.95*** 4.16 8.10* -1.90 6.62*** 8.14*
(1.52) (2.85) (2.32) (2.26) (1.87) (2.62) (4.65) (2.14) (1.17) (4.81)
5 (2002-03) -1.06 7.83** 9.74*** 8.46*** 8.96*** 10.77*** 10.12** -2.25 8.97*** 20.68***
(1.07) (3.14) (2.49) (2.37) (2.33) (2.52) (4.22) (2.17) (1.32) (4.56)
6 (2004-05) -0.74 -2.66 9.63*** 8.93*** 10.58*** 11.80*** 10.06 -4.29** 9.91*** 18.70***
(1.02) (2.46) (2.21) (2.90) (2.54) (3.00) (6.18) (2.06) (1.43) (4.45)
7 (2006-07) -1.01 -1.20 6.77*** 6.90*** 13.57*** 11.76*** 11.67*** -2.35 9.23*** 17.08***
(0.96) (2.60) (2.33) (2.34) (1.98) (2.67) (4.37) (2.10) (1.26) (4.49)
8 (2008-09) -0.92 2.44 7.19*** 7.83*** 14.43*** 13.01*** 21.55*** -2.65 10.09*** 21.43***
(1.38) (2.88) (2.21) (2.42) (2.06) (2.40) (4.48) (2.10) (1.22) (4.68)
N 1,304 5,778 9,303 6,820 8,867 6,734 3,069 7,905 29,363 2,361
Note: The dependent variables are the number of hours in care for children whose mother has a high school degree or less (top panel) and a
Post-Secondary degree (bottom panel). Children from all family types are included. We include the same controls as in Table 3. Standard errors
are in parentheses and all are bootstrapped to account for the sampling design of the NLSCY. Statistical signicance is denoted using asterisks:
*** is p<0.01, ** is p<0.05, and * is p<0.1.
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Table A. 3: Estimated effects of the policy on motherslabour force
participation and weeks worked by the mothers level of education
Age of children 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 5 1 to 4 1 to 4
6 5 mths > 6 mths not eligible eligible 2-parent 1-parent
for K-5 for K-5
Labour force participation
High school or less
3 (1998-99) -0.07 0.13 0.05 0.15* 0.05 -0.05 -0.16 -0.17** 0.04 0.11
(0.13) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09)
4 (2000-01) -0.02 0.17** 0.10 0.15** -0.01 0.19** -0.06 -0.07 0.09* 0.16**
(0.28) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.14) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08)
5 (2002-03) -0.17 0.15 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 0.01 0.07
(0.19) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09)
6 (2004-05) 0.09 0.02 0.28*** -0.02 0.07 -0.26 0.04 0.12** -0.03
(0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.05) (0.09)
7 (2006-07) 0.08 0.17 0.22** 0.21* -0.01 0.10 0.37 0.08 0.12** 0.12
(0.30) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.27) (0.10) (0.05) (0.11)
8 (2008-09) 0.21 0.14 0.12 0.28** 0.07 0.02 -0.11 -0.07 0.15*** 0.05
(0.39) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.16) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11)
N 926 3,523 5,988 4,338 5,698 4,196 2,130 4,992 16,082 4,138
Post-secondary degree
3 (1998-99) 0.19** 0.18** 0.11** 0.10 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.27**
(0.10) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.03) (0.12)
4 (2000-01) 0.29** 0.14* 0.15** 0.16*** 0.07 0.06 -0.03 0.08 0.11*** 0.12
(0.13) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.03) (0.15)
5 (2002-03) -0.39*** 0.08 0.15*** 0.11* 0.06 0.13** 0.12 0.04 0.11*** 0.27**
(0.13) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.03) (0.13)
6 (2004-05) 0.12 0.05 0.15*** 0.04 0.21*** 0.15** 0.01 0.15** 0.12*** 0.41***
(0.18) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.07) (0.03) (0.11)
7 (2006-07) 0.41*** -0.05 0.12** 0.06 0.19*** 0.02 0.15 0.10 0.08** 0.38***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.03) (0.13)
8 (2008-09) 0.27 0.00 0.06 0.16** 0.12** 0.16*** 0.12 0.15** 0.11*** 0.35***
(0.21) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.03) (0.12)
N 1,308 5,855 9,456 6,899 8,950 6,826 3,112 8,016 29,780 2,351
Weeks worked
High school or less
3 (1998-99) -2.35 4.12 1.62 5.70 -0.51 -3.90 -6.08 -7.38** -0.29 4.71
(6.49) (3.25) (2.62) (4.18) (3.58) (3.60) (6.35) (3.52) (2.15) (4.15)
4 (2000-01) 1.68 4.20 4.11 5.80* -1.10 8.10* -1.35 -2.29 2.69 8.30**
(13.87) (3.57) (3.06) (3.23) (3.01) (4.50) (6.47) (3.80) (2.14) (3.82)
5 (2002-03) -7.34 5.61 2.46 2.68 0.72 1.82 -1.30 -5.87 1.38 2.86
(8.26) (4.07) (4.00) (3.52) (3.84) (3.65) (6.75) (3.85) (2.15) (4.22)
6 (2004-05) 1.83 -0.35 11.04*** -1.19 4.72 -8.36 2.69 4.50* -0.38
(4.24) (3.74) (3.56) (4.17) (4.43) (7.77) (4.47) (2.34) (4.54)
7 (2006-07) 10.48 6.29 5.46 9.58* 0.46 7.16 9.55 0.59 5.14** 5.15
(14.94) (4.46) (4.39) (5.32) (4.19) (4.95) (12.54) (4.98) (2.60) (5.54)
8 (2008-09) 12.87 3.65 3.52 6.15 6.34 2.92 -2.09 -6.01 5.06* 3.41
(20.76) (3.57) (3.46) (6.30) (3.92) (6.16) (9.09) (5.57) (2.90) (4.72)
N 923 3,506 5,957 4,328 5,690 4,200 2,132 4,984 16,056 4,119
Post-secondary degree
3 (1998-99) -0.36 3.96 5.64*** 0.69 0.79 -1.11 1.94 0.30 0.94 7.26
(4.37) (3.51) (2.15) (3.22) (2.85) (2.97) (4.83) (3.33) (1.55) (6.05)
4 (2000-01) 6.60 3.58 8.57*** 3.12 2.47 1.82 -3.33 2.36 4.56*** 2.32
(5.84) (3.81) (2.64) (2.63) (2.46) (3.64) (5.49) (3.63) (1.48) (6.74)
5 (2002-03) -7.68 4.54 9.77*** 1.18 2.65 7.09** 4.78 0.71 4.87*** 13.93**
(6.82) (3.85) (2.79) (3.00) (3.45) (2.96) (5.24) (3.52) (1.65) (6.51)
6 (2004-05) 3.50 0.99 5.76** -0.05 8.74*** 6.02* 2.36 4.59 4.52*** 13.58**
(8.69) (3.23) (2.61) (3.09) (2.94) (3.14) (6.56) (3.82) (1.60) (6.18)
7 (2006-07) 8.00 -3.19 1.80 1.28 6.85** -0.31 5.90 5.24 1.73 15.50**
(8.53) (3.40) (2.72) (3.38) (2.79) (3.44) (6.27) (3.89) (1.73) (6.32)
8 (2008-09) 7.88 -0.64 3.64 6.22** 6.74** 7.02** 9.68* 4.95 5.53*** 14.44**
(9.41) (3.12) (2.64) (3.04) (2.78) (2.99) (5.14) (3.79) (1.62) (6.25)
N 1,306 5,840 9,435 6,893 8,949 6,827 3,118 8,010 29,753 2,351
Note: The dependent variables are a dummy for labour force participation of mothers with a high school degree or less (panel 1) and mothers
with a Post-Secondary degree (panel 2), and the number of weeks worked for mothers with a high school degree or less (panel 3) and mothers
with a Post-Secondary degree (panel 4). Children from all family types are included. We include the same controls as in Table 3. Standard errors
are in parentheses and all are bootstrapped to account for the sampling design of the NLSCY. Statistical signicance is denoted using asterisks:
*** is p<0.01, ** is p<0.05, and * is p<0.1.
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Table A. 4: Estimated effects of the policy on cumulative hours of care
Age of children 0 to 4 1 to 5 1 to 5
not eligible eligible
Cumulative hours of care for K-5 for K-5
4 (2000-01) 2.60* 4.83* 1.20
(1.42) (2.68) (1.47)
5 (2002-03) 5.02*** 8.82*** 3.93***
(1.26) (2.24) (1.28)
6 (2004-05) 5.89*** 7.29** 5.89***
(1.49) (3.14) (1.47)
7 (2006-07) 7.71*** 12.75*** 5.89***
(1.57) (2.89) (1.56)
8 (2008-09) 5.99*** 16.99*** 7.47***
(1.39) (2.87) (1.55)
Observations 9,912 4,171 11,333
Note: The dependent variable is the cumulative number of hours in care (including zero hours of care) between ages 0 to 4 and 1 to 5 for
longitudinal children from waves 1 to 8. The age of children included in the sample is specied at the top of each column. Children from all
family types are included. We include the same controls as in Table 3. Standard errors are in parentheses and all are bootstrapped to account
for the sampling design of the NLSCY. Statistical signicance is denoted using asterisks: *** is p<0.01, ** is p<0.05, and * is p<0.1.
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